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INTRODUCTION
1

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) held in
1995 that “the interpretation and construction of patent claims,
which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a
2
matter of law exclusively for the court.” This definitive statement
from Markman v. Westview Instruments (“Markman I”) affects nearly all
patent infringement litigation in the United States, because claim
construction must occur before an infringement or validity analysis
3
can be performed. Claim construction involves “determining the
4
meaning and scope of the patent claims.” In Markman I, a majority
of the CAFC held that “[b]ecause claim construction is a matter of
5
law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”
An important result of Markman I has been the emergence of the
6
“Markman Hearing” where the court construes the claims at issue in
a hearing separate from the rest of the litigation to determine their
7
meaning.

1

Congress established the CAFC in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (creating the only federal appellate court based
on jurisdiction rather than geography). The CAFC is responsible for appellate
review of patent cases decided by the federal district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a);
see also CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 11.06[3][a].
2
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman I].
3
See id. at 976 (regarding claim construction prior to an examination of
infringement); Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (regarding claim construction before determining claim validity).
4
Markman I, 52 F.3d. at 976.
5
Id. at 979 (Majority opinion by Archer, C.J.); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Smiths, 183 F.3d at 1353.
6
The Markman Hearing may be viewed as a useful tool to determine the correct
claim construction. However, it may add additional time and cost to the litigation.
Patent litigation has been cited as costing each side at least one million dollars. See
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187 (1998).
7
While typically performed by the trial court judge, the judge may appoint a
magistrate or special master. See Robert C. Weiss et al., Markman Practice, Procedure
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the CAFC’s holding
8
in Markman II. Justice Souter stated that claim construction is
9
“exclusively within the province of the court.” A decisive factor in
this determination was the special training of judges. This special
training would make it more likely that the trial judge, and not the
10
jury, would properly construe the claims.
The critical policy
rationale behind the Court’s affirmance was the fear of uncertainty in
11
patent litigation should juries perform claim construction.
A key issue coming out of Markman I & II is whether the
“training and discipline” of federal district court judges allows them
12
to properly construe patent claims. As Judge Rader once pointed
out, the CAFC reversed nearly forty percent of lower court claim
construction decisions between the time of Markman I and November
13
24, 1997. Judge Rader maintained that “this reversal rate, hovering
near fifty percent, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much
14
higher would provide greater certainty.”
In the years since Judge Rader’s comments, reversal rates on
15
claim construction have not improved.
This Comment proposes
that an understanding of claim format, which undoubtedly presents

and Tactics, in PATENT LITIGATION 2000, at 117, 134 n.13 (PLI Intellectual Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. G-619, 2000); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(THIRD) § 20.14 (1995). The judge may choose not to hold a separate hearing to
construe the claims, but instead merely issue a claim construction ruling.
8
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter
Markman II].
9
Id. at 372.
10
Id. at 388-89.
11
Id. at 391 (“Uniformity would, however, be ill served by submitting issues of
document construction to juries.”).
12
Judge Mayer, in a concurrence to Markman I, aptly noted that “there is simply
no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the
complex technical issues often present in patent cases.” Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996) (Mayer, J., concurring).
13
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1476 n.16 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
14
Id. at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting). Reversal rates significantly higher (e.g.,
90%) would give litigants the “certainty” that the claim construction will be reversed
by the CAFC.
15
See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty And Unpredictability In Patent Litigation:
The Time Is Ripe For A Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
175, 203-07 (2001) (noting that from the time of Markman I through 2000, the CAFC
reversed or modified 65 out of 160 district court claim construction decisions,
approximately 40%). In 2001, the CAFC reversed 41.5% of lower court claim
constructions. See infra at Part III.C. for a complete analysis of the CAFC cases
decided in 2001.
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one of the most bizarre sentence structures in the English language,
is fundamental to performing a correct claim construction analysis.
In addition to understanding claim format, trial judges need clear
guidance from the CAFC.
For example, the trial courts, in
attempting to live up to the strictures of Markman I, perform
17
Markman Hearings at every stage of litigation.
There are no
18
controlling standards for when (or if) to hold a Markman Hearing.
Indeed, the lack of guidance from the CAFC may leave trial judges
19
uncertain as to how best to conduct claim construction hearings.
The CAFC should be clear about when (and how) to hold Markman
20
Hearings. The CAFC should indicate which substantive resources
can help the judge perform claim construction. Furthermore, the
CAFC should articulate when and how to apply canons of claim
21
construction.
This Comment will analyze trial courts’ claim construction in
22
light of subsequent CAFC review of those decisions. One goal is to
determine whether the use of Markman Hearings increases the
likelihood of affirmance. Another goal is to uncover what mistakes
trial courts continue to make in spite of a vast body of CAFC decisions
to guide them. Part I presents background information regarding
patents generally and Markman I and its progeny. Part II discusses
the Markman Hearing and related claim construction resources. Part
III reviews all of the CAFC’s claim construction decisions from 2001
to find what key mistakes trial judges continue to make when
construing patent claims. Part III concludes with a summary of the
16

See The Honorable S. Jay Plager, Symposium: Intellectual Property Challenges in the
Next Century: Article Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century:
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 71 (2001) (“The writing of
English this is not . . . reading claims is an art of sorts, involving half technology and
half linguistics. To many trial judges it is a foreign art; understandably, they are not
batting 1.000 (more like .500)”).
17
See infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text.
20
See infra Part II.B.2.
21
See infra Part II.B.3.
22
For purposes of this article, the author conducted a detailed study of all CAFC
cases decided in 2001 where claim construction was an issue (i.e., where the CAFC
issued a decision that included affirming or reversing a lower court’s claim
construction). The study analyzed ninety-four cases. The study examined whether
Markman Hearings were held, whether the trial court granted summary judgment,
whether the CAFC reversed summary judgment on appeal, and whether the CAFC
reversed the claim construction on appeal. The analysis also looked at reasons why
the CAFC reversed claim construction decisions, in the hope that such information
will provide direction for trial courts to improve their claim constructions in the
future. See infra note 271 for more details about this study.
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findings and a proposal to improve trial court claim construction
efficacy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Patent Grant
23

A patent is both a legal and technical document. It provides
24
the patentee with a limited monopoly that allows him to prevent
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
25
The United States
patented invention into the United States.
Constitution provides Congress the right to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
26
Discoveries.”
Congress delegates this responsibility to the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), a branch of the Department of
27
Commerce. After a patent examiner determines that the claims of a
28
29
30
patent application are novel, useful and non-obvious, and meet all
other statutory requirements, the application is approved by the
31
Director (formerly Commissioner) of Patents and Trademarks. The
23

Markman I articulated the legal aspect of the patent: “The patent is a fully
integrated written instrument . . . [and is] a government grant of rights to the
patentee.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994)). The
technical aspect of the patent:
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use
the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (first paragraph) (1994).
24
Utility patents (and plant patents) based on applications filed on or after June
8, 1995 are in force for twenty years from date of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); see also
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2700 (“MPEP”) (U.S. Department of
Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 8th ed. 2001). Design
patents are valid for fourteen years from date of issue. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994). The
CAFC cases from 2001, and hence the scope of this Comment, only involve utility
patents.
25
35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (1994).
26
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27
35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
28
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (stating that a person “shall be entitled to a patent
unless” the invention is precluded by any one (or more) of six types of events).
29
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (identifying the types of inventions that are patentable
if new and useful).
30
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (denying patentability where prior art is not identical to
the claims of the application but the differences between them are too small).
31
The official title of the person in charge of the USPTO is “Under Secretary of
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32

PTO then issues the patent grant. The grant allows the patentee to
enforce the patent claims, because only the claims constitute the
33
metes and bounds of the limited monopoly.
34
An applicant may
Nearly anyone can apply for a patent.
prepare the application pro se, or can enlist the aid of a patent agent
35
or attorney.
Regardless of who prepares a non-provisional
36
37
38
application, it must contain a specification, at least one claim, a
39
40
drawing (if necessary) and the applicant’s oath (or declaration)
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (1994). Unlike the first Commissioner,
Thomas Jefferson (see Amy Harmon, In the ‘Idea Wars,’ a Fight to Control a New
Currency, N. Y. TIMES, November 11, 2001, at BU 7), Directors of the USPTO no
longer examine patent applications themselves. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994). There is a
patent examination corps numbering several thousand, which has this duty
(according to the PTO Information Directory (August 2000)); see also the on-line
USPTO employee locator at http://pair.uspto.gov/cgi-bin/final/employee_
loc.pl?action=querypg (last visited March 24, 2002). Two current members of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judge Gajarsa and Judge Linn, were patent
examiners at one time. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial
Biographies, Judges of the Federal Circuit, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html
(last revised Mar. 5, 2002).
32
35 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“The Patent and Trademark Office shall have a seal
which letters patent, certificates of trade-mark registrations, and papers issued from
the office shall be authenticated”).
33
35 U.S.C. § 112 (second paragraph) (1994); MPEP 2106(C) (“The claims
define the property rights provided by a patent, and thus require careful scrutiny”).
34
35 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (excluding officers and employees of the PTO from
applying for a patent during the course of employment and one year after
employment).
35
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (1994) (giving the PTO the power to establish
regulations governing “the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants”); See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.33-34; 10.5-10 (2000). An
agent is a person not an attorney but who has a science or technical background
meeting the requirements promulgated by the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.6(b) and
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR
REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE (for the April 17, 2002 exam), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/index.html (last modified May
22, 2002). The author of this Comment is a registered patent agent. The views
expressed herein are the views of the author, and not necessarily those of his
employers or their clients.
36
37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2000) provides for a non-provisional application (“NPA”).
The NPA is a complete application, including claims. Section 1.53(c) permits an
applicant to file a provisional patent application (“PPA”). The PPA need not present
claims. The PPA is not examined by the PTO. It merely acts as a placeholder, giving
the applicant one year to further develop or market the invention, at which time an
NPA can be filed claiming the benefit of the filing date of the PPA without fear of
breaking a statutory bar. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
37
35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(A); 112 (1994).
38
35 U.S.C. § 112 (second paragraph).
39
35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(B); 113 (1994).
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stating “he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
41
improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent.”
The specification provides a detailed presentation and
42
explanation of the invention. “The specification shall conclude with
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
43
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
The purpose of the specification is to “enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
44
to make and use the same.” The person skilled in the art necessarily
has some expertise and familiarity with the technology of the
45
invention. Thus, the patent may be enabling and valid, but may not
provide enough information to make the technology understandable
to a judge or a jury. As will be explained below, a correct claim
construction requires the judge to perform the analysis from the
point of view of a “person skilled in the art.”
B. Patent Prosecution
46

After it is filed, a patent examiner reviews the application to
47
ensure it meets the statutory requirements. Notably, the examiner
48
performs his or her own claim construction.
The examiner
prepares an Office Action pointing out deficiencies in the application
40

35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(C) (1994).
Id. § 115.
42
“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it.” Id. § 112 (first paragraph); 37
C.F.R. § 1.71 (2000). The patent application also includes a title and an abstract. 37
C.F.R. § 1.72 (2000). The PTO cannot use the abstract when interpreting the scope
of a claim. 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b). However, the courts are not bound by this
requirement. See Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1341
n.* (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2000) for a listing of application
elements.
43
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (1994).
44
Id. at para. 1.
45
Id. § 282 (1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting
such invalidity.”).
46
Patent examiners are quasi-legal officials.
See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
47
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2000) (Nature of examination).
48
MPEP 2106(C) (“Office personnel must first determine the scope of a claim by
thoroughly analyzing the language of the claim before determining if the claim
complies with each statutory requirement for patentability.”). An overview of patent
examiner claim construction is discussed infra Part II.B.2, which further explains
MPEP §§ 2106(C) and 2111.
41
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49

and often rejects most (if not all) of the claims. The applicant (or
his attorney or agent) has the opportunity to file an amendment
50
responding to the Office Action. The amendment must “distinctly
and specifically point[] out the supposed errors in the examiner’s
action and must reply to every ground of objection and rejection in
51
the prior Office [A]ction.” Amendments often include changes to
52
the claims so as to distinguish them from the prior art. This give
and take between the examiner and the applicant continues until the
examiner allows the claims or the applicant abandons the
53
application. The amendments and Office Actions form a critical
54
part of the prosecution history of the application, because they
often explain or limit the scope of the claims.
C. Patent Litigation
Patent litigation is a federal matter, taking place almost
55
exclusively in the district courts. Plaintiffs can elect either a jury
49

The author conducted an informal survey of twenty-five patent attorneys and
agents, asking them what percentage of claims are typically rejected in a first office
action. The survey provided four percentage ranges: 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and
75-100%. The practitioners unanimously responded with 75-100%. Survey results
are on file with the author.
50
37 C.F.R. § 1.111.
51
Id. § 1.111(b).
52
The term “prior art” is actually a term of art unto itself. It includes items such
as patents and publications available that predate the effective date of the instant
patent application (the effective date is typically the date filed at the PTO). See, e.g.,
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Note that changes made to claim elements during
prosecution that narrow the scope of the claim may give rise to prosecution history
estoppel. See Festo Corp. v. Shokatsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381
(Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
53
The applicant has the option of continuing prosecution by filing continuing
applications under 37 C.F.R. section 1.53(b) or (d), or by filing a request for
continuing examination under 37 C.F.R. section 1.114 (2000). A final rejection may
be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 35 U.S.C. § 134
(1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (2000). See generally MPEP ch. 1200.
54
The written record of a patent application was formerly known as the “file
wrapper,” see Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 133
F. Supp. 2d 833, 837 (E.D. Va. 2001), and is now usually referred to as the
“prosecution history.” See Karen Millane Whitney, Sources of Patent Prosecution History
Must Not Violate Public Notice Requirement, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 266, 268 n.6 (2001)
(“Prosecution history is synonymous with the file wrapper of the patent.”).
55
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
cases.” Id. Note that while district courts have patent case jurisdiction to the
exclusion of state courts, the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the
Court of Federal Claims and the International Trade Commission may all hear
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56

trial or a bench trial. Unlike patent attorneys and agents, there is
no requirement that judges have any specific expertise with regard to
57
patent-related matters. Thus, the judge may not have any practical
experience regarding claims or patent prosecution. However, the
judge should have some understanding of patents generally and the
58
patent at issue, in order to effectively handle the litigation.
Three CAFC decisions discuss some general guidelines for claim
construction. Markman I provides a foundation for district court
59
claim construction. Vitronics v. Conceptronics explains how to deal
with different types of patent-related evidence.
Cybor v. FAS
Technologies explains why the CAFC performs de novo review of claim
60
construction. These cases will be examined in turn.

patent cases under their respective jurisdictional scopes. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994); 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1994).
56
FED. R. CIV. P. 38; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – an
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (2000) (extensively
analyzing 1411 patent cases that went to trial over a seventeen year period, from 1983
through 1999 to determine whether there was any disparity between decisions
rendered by judges as opposed to juries).
57
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (1994) permits the Commissioner to recognize and
regulate patent attorneys and agents. See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5-10.6 (2000). Prior to
becoming a patent attorney or agent, the individual must pass a rigorous
examination known as the “Patent Bar.” See 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (2000). The
examination tests “an applicant’s knowledge of patent law and United States Patent
and Trademark Office rules, practice and procedure; understanding of claim
drafting and ability to properly draft claims.” GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR
ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 6 (for the April 17, 2002
exam), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/index.html
(last modified May 22, 2002). The Patent Bar is believed to be the only specialty
exam an attorney must pass to practice in a particular area of law. See also Mark L.
Austrian & Shaun Mohler, Timing is Everything in Patent Litigation – Fulfilling the
Promise of Markman, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 229 (1999) (noting that trial judges
generally have no patent experience); see also Moore, supra note 56, at 374 (“Most
judges have no special knowledge, education or training in the technology that is at
issue in a patent case.”).
58
Under the adversarial system the litigants should educate the judge because it
is not the judge’s role to perform her own fact-finding. However, without a proper
foundation, claim construction (like other specialized areas of law) is very difficult to
perform correctly, as the 40% reversal rate cited by Judge Rader illustrates. See supra
text accompanying note 13. It is also important to note that patent litigation
attorneys, unless practicing before the USPTO in an appeal or interference, are not
required to be licensed to practice patent law before the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5
(individuals recognized to represent applicants before the USPTO “in the
preparation and prosecution of applications”), 10.7 (dealing with registration to
practice before the USPTO).
59
90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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1. Markman I: Claim Construction as Determined by the
CAFC
In Markman I, plaintiff Herbert Markman held a patent for an
61
“Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores.”
Markman sued Westview Instruments and Althon Enterprises for
62
allegedly infringing claims 1, 10, and 14 of the patent.
The focal point of the litigation became the meaning of the
term “inventory” as used in the claims. The trial court “charged the
jury on infringement, instructing it to ‘determine the meaning of the
claims . . . using the relevant patent documents including the
63
The jury
specifications, the drawings and the file histories.’”
determined that the defendants infringed claims 1 and 10, but not
64
65
14. The judge then construed the meaning of the claims. The
judge ruled that the term “‘inventory’ meant ‘articles of clothing’ and
66
not simply transaction totals or dollars.”
Under such an
interpretation, the court held that defendants did not infringe the
claims at issue, and granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a
67
matter of law.
68
The CAFC
Markman appealed the district court decision.
began its claim construction analysis by noting that it (the CAFC) had
69
not consistently held that claim construction is a matter of law. In
order to resolve the inconsistency, the CAFC stated that the Supreme
Court had “repeatedly held that the construction of a patent claim is
70
a matter of law exclusively for the court.” Furthermore, the CAFC
71
stated that written documents are exclusively construed by the court.
Next, the CAFC analyzed the types of evidence available to aid a
judge in construing the claims. The three intrinsic sources of
evidence are “the claims, the specification, and the prosecution
72
73
history.”
All other evidence is extrinsic, including dictionaries,
61

52 F.3d at 971. (The patent was a reissue patent, No. 33,054. Positek, a
licensee of the patent, was also a plaintiff in the litigation.).
62
Id. at 972.
63
Id. at 973.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 970.
69
Id. at 976-77.
70
Id. at 977.
71
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 978.
72
Id. at 979. The prosecution history includes all documents filed in conjunction
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treatises, sales literature, and inventor and expert testimony.
Not all evidence is created equal. The sole purpose of examining
evidence besides the claims themselves is to help the judge interpret
the claims. The written description of the specification and the
prosecution history “can and should be used to understand the
75
language used in the claims.” Use of extrinsic evidence is even more
limited. It “is to be used for the court’s understanding of the patent,
not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the
76
claims.” Thus, a judge should use extrinsic evidence to educate
herself on the technology pertaining to the patent such that she can
77
correctly apply intrinsic evidence in claim construction.
In Markman I, the CAFC noted that the intrinsic evidence
supported the district court’s claim construction, finding that “the
language of the claim itself suggests the conclusion that the drycleaner’s ‘inventory’ includes clothing. The patent specification
78
confirms this . . . [T]he prosecution history is also in accord.” The
CAFC discounted testimony and sales literature pointing at
79
Although they
alternative constructions, giving it no deference.
might have “in fact used ‘inventory’ to mean other than articles of
clothing, Westview’s sales literature and the testimony of its president
do not dissuade us from our legal construction of the claim, based on
80
the patent and prosecution history.”
After examining the various types of evidence available, the
court went on to weigh how best to analyze the claims. The court
compared patents to contracts and statutes, finding that they are
81
A contract is a private
more closely equated with the latter.
82
agreement between two parties, whereas the patent is a limited
with the patent. For example, applicants may file an invention disclosure statement
(“IDS”) containing listings of relevant material. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56 (2000) (“Duty
to disclose information material to patentability”), 1.97 (2000) (“Filing of
information disclosure statement”), and 1.98 (2000) (“Content of information
disclosure statement”).
73
Dictionaries are really a hybrid of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. See infra
Part III.D for a discussion on this somewhat problematic form of evidence.
74
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980.
75
Id. The abstract may also be used by the court to determine the scope of the
invention. See supra note 42.
76
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 981.
77
Id. (stating that the court should look “to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its
construction of the written document”).
78
Id. at 982.
79
Id. at 983.
80
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 983.
81
Id. at 987.
82
Id.
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monopoly obtained from the federal government.
The parol
evidence rule may act to exclude certain information and
84
documentation when analyzing a contract.
In contrast, patent
85
examiners evaluate patent applications in ex parte proceedings. The
86
parol evidence rule does not apply to patents.
On the other hand, the court stated that “statutes are written
instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are
bound to follow. Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the
87
public, unlike private agreements between contracting parties.” The
judge tasked with interpreting a statute “looks to the language of the
statute and construes it according to the traditional tools of statutory
88
construction.”
The judge may review the legislative history of a
89
statute if necessary.
Legislative history is much like a patent’s
90
prosecution history, because both are available to the public. The
final factor tipping the scales in favor of a statute-like analysis by the
court was intent. As with statutes, the “subjective meaning that a
patentee may ascribe to claim language is also not determinative.
Thus, it is from the public record that a court should seek in a patent
91
infringement case to find the meaning of claim language.”
Therefore, the CAFC concluded that judges must perform claim
92
construction.
2. Vitronics: Evidence Used In Claim Construction
More than a year after deciding Markman I—and only a few
93
months after the Supreme Court affirmed Markman I —the CAFC
expanded upon its discussion of patent evidence in Vitronics v.

83

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1998) (providing that “a final expression of [the agreement]
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213
(1978).
85
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 985.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 987.
88
Id. The CAFC also briefly mentioned cannons of construction regarding
statutes. Id. Cannons of construction also exist in patent law, and will be discussed
infra Part II.B.2.
89
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 987.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 970-71.
93
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
84
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94

Conceptronics. Vitronics dealt with a patent for a method of reflowing
95
solder during the manufacture of printed circuit boards (“PCBs”).
Both plaintiff and defendant manufactured ovens used to make the
96
PCBs.
Typically, a circuit board is designed and fabricated with contact
areas (e.g., pads) to receive surface mounted devices such as resistors,
97
capacitors, integrated circuits and other electronic components. A
solder paste is applied before the surface mounted devices are placed
98
on the pads. After the devices are put on the circuit board, the
99
board goes through an oven. The heat from the oven melts the
100
solder paste.
Once the circuit board cools, the surface mounted
101
devices are securely attached to the board via the solder.
The only issue in the case dealt with a term in claim 1, regarding
102
a “method for reflow soldering.”
The question was what did the
103
term “solder reflow temperature” mean.
The trial court held that
the term meant specifically a liquidus temperature of 183ºC, as
104
defendant Conceptronics maintained. In construing the term, the
trial court relied not only on intrinsic evidence, but also on “expert
testimony, prior testimony and writings of Vitronics and its
105
employees, and technical references.”
In reversing the judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiff,
the CAFC analyzed the extrinsic evidence relied on by the trial
106
court.
The Court stated that the testimony and documents
presented by the defendant supported its contention that solder
107
reflow occurred at the liquidus temperature of 183ºC. However, a

94

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1579.
96
Id. at 1578-79.
97
Id. at 1579; see also VERN SOLBERG, DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR SURFACE MOUNT
TECHNOLOGY 10, 34-49 (1990).
98
90 F.3d at 1579.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1579.
103
Id. at 1579-80. At trial, the judge performed claim construction of the term at
the end of testimony. Id. at 1580.
104
Id. at 1580.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1581, 1585. The CAFC noted that while the trial court did not specify
which evidence it used in rendering its claim construction, it “must have relied on
the testimony presented by Conceptronic that ‘solder reflow temperature’ and
‘liquidus temperature’ were synonymous.” Id. at 1585 n.7.
107
Id. at 1581.
95
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review of the intrinsic evidence clearly showed that solder reflow
108
temperature meant “peak reflow temperature.”
The CAFC found the intrinsic evidence dispositive and was clear
109
to point out that intrinsic evidence will be sufficient in most cases.
Only after a review of the intrinsic evidence, if “some genuine
ambiguity [exists] in the claims,” should the court look at extrinsic
110
evidence.
Extrinsic evidence should be used to educate the judge
111
so that she can sufficiently interpret the intrinsic evidence.
However, not all extrinsic evidence is created equal.
The CAFC lumped all forms of testimony regarding claim
construction together. Whether from “an attorney, a technical
112
expert, or the inventor,” it is equally suspect. Such “expert
testimony . . . often only indicates what a particular expert believes a
113
term means.”
Furthermore, “opinion testimony on claim
construction should be treated with the utmost caution for it is no
114
better than opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms.”
Documents predating the patent, including other patents,
technical literature, treatises and dictionaries are “to a lesser extent . .
115
. more objective and reliable guides” than testimony.
That is
because these documents “are accessible to the public in advance of
116
litigation.”
As will be seen later, the CAFC has a special fondness
117
for dictionaries.
Contrary to its caution against using extrinsic
information, the CAFC in Vitronics pointed out that dictionaries and
treatises:
are worthy of special note. Judges are free to consult such
resources at any time in order to better understand the
underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions
when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition
does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a

108

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. The peak reflow temperature was between 210ºC
and 218ºC. Id.
109
“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any
ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on
extrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1583. Almost as an aside, near the very end of the decision
the court stated that situations where extrinsic evidence is needed “will rarely, if ever,
occur.” Id. at 1585.
110
Id. at 1584.
111
Id.
112
Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1585.
113
Id. at 1584.
114
Id. at 1585.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See infra Part III.D.
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118

reading of the patent documents.

To sum up, dictionaries and treatises may be employed at any
time unless the intrinsic evidence explicitly defines a claim element
in a specific way. The trial court may admit other extrinsic evidence
119
at its discretion.
Prior art references may be used when the
intrinsic evidence is unclear. A court should attempt to use prior art
before admitting testimony, because “prior art references may . . . be
more indicative of what all those skilled in the art generally believe a
120
certain term means.”
When all else fails, the court may consider
testimony to help clear up any remaining confusion. And the judge
must remember that the extrinsic evidence is merely a tool to help
him or her construe the claims in light of the intrinsic evidence.
Extrinsic evidence must not be employed to contradict what the
intrinsic evidence teaches.
3. Cybor v. FAS: the Standard of Review
The Supreme Court held in Markman II that claim construction
121
was a matter of law for the courts to decide.
The Supreme Court
acknowledged that claim construction involved both law and facts,
but made a pragmatic decision to place this “mongrel practice” in the
122
hands of the judiciary.
Less than two years later, in Cybor v. FAS
Technologies, the CAFC applied a generous logic to Markman II and
declared en banc that it had the authority to review claim construction
123
decisions de novo.
The decision in Cybor was aimed at reaffirming
the CAFC’s earlier enunciation of the de novo standard, while
pointing out that some of its cases post-Markman I had applied a
124
clearly erroneous standard.
The Cybor majority criticized the idea that facts played a role in
claim construction. “[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal
question, we review claim construction [de novo] on appeal including

118

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6.
Id. at 1584. In contrast, the parol evidence rule prevents the admission of
certain evidence with respect to contractual agreements. U.C.C. § 2-202; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1978).
120
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
121
See supra text accompanying note 9.
122
517 U.S. 370, 388-89.
123
138 F.3d 1448, 1451. “[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court’s unanimous
affirmance in Markman v. Westview Industries, Inc., of our [en banc] judgment in
that case fully supports our conclusion that claim construction, as a purely legal issue,
is subject to [de novo] review on appeal.” Id. (emphasis added).
124
Id. at 1454.
119
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any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”
By totally ignoring the findings of the trial court in its claim
construction, arguably the CAFC will reverse a higher percentage of
126
cases than had it chosen a more deferential standard of review.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Cybor present insights
into the turmoil within the CAFC regarding appellate claim
construction. Judge Plager stated that the CAFC should not wholly
disregard the analysis of the trial court when performing its own
claim construction. “Common sense dictates that the trial judge’s
127
view will carry weight.” The judge acknowledged that the important
128
question to keep in mind is “what do the claims mean?” Judge
Bryson was also of the mind to rely on the trial court’s legwork.
Merely because “claim construction is an issue of law does not mean
that we intend to disregard the work done by district courts in claim
construction or that we will give no weight to a district court’s
129
conclusion as to claim construction.”
Judge Mayer, while concurring, was even more outspoken
against the non-deferential standard enunciated by the majority. The
judge first noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman II to
place the burden of claim construction on the judge instead of the
130
jury “was a perilous decision of last resort.”
Next, the judge
correctly pointed out that the Supreme Court could have, but did
not, “accept our formulation of claim construction[] as a pure
131
question of law to be decided [de novo] in all cases on appeal.”
Judge Mayer stated that a pure de novo standard of review “would
transform [the CAFC] into a trial court of first and usually last
125

Id. at 1456. The CAFC also noted that certain comments by the Supreme
Court in Markman II “do not support the view that . . . while construction is a legal
question for the judge, there may also be underlying fact questions.” Id.
126
See Moore, supra note 56, at 396-97 (“[D]eferential standards of review should
result in a greater number of overall affirmances (lower reversal rates) by the CAFC
than in cases resolved on dispositive motions (such as summary judgment), where
the standard of review would be de novo.”). On the other hand, one could argue that
even if the standard of review were more deferential to trial courts, the CAFC would
still overturn claim constructions at the same rate because the Court could find that
any claim construction error was “clear error.”
127
138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 1464 (Mayer, J., concurring).
131
Id. The judge also averred that because the Supreme Court chose judges to
determine the meaning of claims rather than juries, the standard of review should
reflect some deference. “[W]hen the judge finds facts or accepts the factual
determination of a jury, those facts are entitled to greater deference than [de novo]
fact findings on appeal.” Id.
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132

resort.”
Notably, Judge Mayer commented that the CAFC was
sending a terrible message to trial courts, subliminally
recommending them to not clearly articulate their claim construction
133
because they stood a better chance of being affirmed on appeal.
The most blistering criticism of the majority opinion came in a
dissent by Judge Rader.
The judge commented that blind
indifference to the work of the trial court would “undermine, if not
destroy, the values of certainty and predictability sought by [Markman
134
I].”
Judge Rader presented an extensive list of procedural
135
problems created by the CAFC’s decision in Markman I.
Furthermore, the judge stated that the majority had “sub silentio
redefined the claim construction inquiry” because the decisions in
Markman I and Vitronics sought to mitigate the use of expert
136
testimony.
With the benefit of three years of case law post-Markman I, Judge
Rader pointed out in a footnote that de novo review resulted in
“reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all claim construction
137
since Markman I.” Four years after Cybor, the question that remains
is whether those involved in patent litigation:
have enough experience with “Markman Hearings” and with
appellate review under the [de novo] regime to draw any
empirically sound conclusions. In such circumstances there is
much to be said for refraining from premature and
argumentative judgments about what it all means, and for
138
allowing sufficient time to actually see how it works.

As Part III.C. will demonstrated later, there is sufficient evidence to
conclude that Markman Hearings do not promote correct claim
construction.

132

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1471.
134
Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader also noted that appropriate
deference to trial judges would “restore the trial court’s prominence in the claim
interpretation function and bring again more certainty at an earlier stage of the
judicial process.” Id. at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 1475, n14 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader listed eight “procedural
deviations.” Two dealt with claim interpretation, two with multiple trials, and
another cautioned against a bias in favor of summary judgment. The summary
judgment problem will be examined more fully infra Part III.B.
136
Id. “In any event, it seems a contradiction to bar those of skill in the art at the
time of invention from a search for the meaning of terms to one of skill in the art at
the time of the invention.” Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
137
See supra text accompanying note 13.
138
138 F.3d at 1476 (Plager, J., concurring).
133
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II. MARKMAN HEARINGS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY
A. The Markman Hearing: What it is and How it Works
The Markman Hearing, or claim construction hearing, is a
hearing in which the parties present evidence bearing on the
139
meaning of the patent claims at issue. There are no requirements
140
as to procedures the judge must follow. In fact, the judge need not
141
even hold a Markman Hearing before construing the claims.
Because there are no rules or guidelines, it is not surprising that
trial judges perform Markman Hearings at every stage of litigation
142
prior to charging the jury.
The hearing can take place before,
143
during or after discovery.
It can occur at summary judgment or
144
It can also happen during trial,
right before opening arguments.
145
either before or after closing arguments.
It may be a separate
146
hearing or may be combined with a summary judgment motion.
Each alternative has its own benefits and drawbacks. Holding
the hearing at some point before trial promotes efficiencies in both
147
cost and time at the expense of fully exploring all the evidence.
Hearings performed during the trial may allow the judge to examine
all the relevant evidence, but with the increased expense of putting
148
on a trial.
Alternatively, efficiency-minded litigants may attempt
149
However, the CAFC rarely (if
some form of an expedited appeal.

139

ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 12.02 (2001) (“[S]hortly
after [Markman I], some district courts began to hold separate hearings to hear
arguments and take testimony concerning disputed meanings of claim terms.”).
140
Ballard Med. Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Contrary to Ballard’s contention, Markman [I] does not require a
district court to follow any particular procedure in conducting claim construction.”).
141
Id. at 1358. “There is nothing unique about claim construction that requires
the court to proceed according to any particular protocol. As long as the trial court
construes the claims to the extent necessary to determine whether the accused device
infringes, the court may approach the task in any way that it deems best.” Id. (emphasis
added). However, because appellate courts have reversed trial courts at such a high
rate, one suggestion is for the CAFC to prepare formal guidelines that judges may
follow should they choose to hold a Markman Hearing.
142
See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for
the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55 (1999). Lee and
Krug posit that the timing of the Markman Hearing is “[o]ne of the most intractable
issues created by Markman [I].” Id. at 56.
143
Id. at 73.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
KAHRL, supra note 139, § 12.02[A].
148
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 6.
149
See John B. Pegram, Markman and its Implications, 78 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF.
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ever) accepts interlocutory appeals of claim interpretation.
Since
there is no consistency among trial courts as to the timing of
Markman Hearings, the obvious, though unanswered, question is
151
whether timing impacts claim construction reversal rates.
B. Patent Litigation Resources Available to Aid the Trial Judge
Various procedural, legal and substantive resources exist to help
the trial judge in the claim construction task. Procedural resources
include magistrate judges, special masters, court-appointed experts
and local patent rules that lay out templates for case management.
Substantive resources include patent-related literature that provides
claim construction guidance. Legal resources comprise the cannons
of claim construction.
1. Procedural Resources
The judge may decide to “farm out” the Markman Hearing to a
152
special master under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The
special master, such as a patent attorney, performs the hearing and
issues a claim construction report, which the trial judge may choose
153
to adopt.
Alternatively, the trial judge may employ a magistrate
SOC’Y 561, 567 (1996) (discussing various methods including summary judgment,
certification, preliminary injunction, and a separate judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b)).
150
Lee & Krug, supra note 142, at 68 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). However, litigants have begun to
stipulate as to claim construction rulings in order to expedite an appeal. See
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2001). In that case, Generation II sued Medical Technology over a patent for an
orthopedic knee brace. Id. at 1362. The trial court construed the claims in such a
way that Medical Technology did not infringe. Id. Generation II stipulated as to
entry of a judgment of non-infringement and then appealed to the CAFC. Id. at
1363.
151
In order to perform such an analysis, one would likely have to examine the
trial court records for every claim construction decision appealed to the CAFC.
Unfortunately, the records may not reflect when (or if) hearings were held, the
evidence presented, or the evidence relied upon by the judge. Thus, reliable
statistical information regarding this question will be left for another day.
152
FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (“The court in which any action is pending may appoint a
special master therein.”).
153
See Thomas L. Creel & Thomas McGahren, Use of Special Masters in Patent
Litigation: A Special Master’s Perspective, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 109, 117 n.20 (1998) (“Special
masters make findings that may then be offered in evidence.”); see also Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The district court appointed a special master and adopted the
special master’s claim construction. Id. The district court granted summary
judgment based upon the claim construction. Id. On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the
claim construction. Id. at 1362.
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154

judge in lieu of a special master.
If the judge is unwilling to cede
construction to a special master or magistrate, she may decide to
appoint an expert to help explain technology requiring special
155
expertise.
Whether or not a trial judge relies on a special master,
magistrate or an expert, she may find it helpful to follow some preset
procedure such as a pretrial conference under Federal Rule of Civil
156
Procedure 16. While some district courts may be testing their own
local rules, to date only the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California has promulgated “Patent Local Rules”
157
specifically for patent infringement cases.
These patent rules are
directed mainly to case management, setting out timelines for the
158
disclosures of asserted claims and
management of the suit,
159
160
contentions, and claim construction proceedings.
The judge
“may accelerate, extend, eliminate, or modify the obligations or
161
deadlines . . . based on the circumstances of any particular case.”
These Patent Local Rules set forth five steps leading up to the
Markman Hearing. First, the parties exchange proposed terms and
162
claim elements.
Next, the litigants exchange their preliminary
163
claim constructions and lists of extrinsic evidence. The third step is
164
Discovery
a Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement.

154

FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1994). A magistrate judge may be
chosen under Section 636(b)(2) without the consent of the parties, but under Rule
53(f) the magistrate may be chosen without the consent of the litigants only upon
some exceptional circumstances. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f) advisory committee’s note
(1983 Amendments).
155
FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Mediacom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d
17, 29-30 & n.11 (D. Mass. 1998) (ordering the parties to “agree on an appropriate
artisan” who understood the technology in order to educate the judge).
156
FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
157
N.D. C.A. USDC Patent L.R. 1-1 to 4-6 (2001) (formerly Civil Local Rules 16-6
to 16-11 (1997) [hereinafter “Patent L.R.”].
158
Patent L.R. 2-1.
159
Patent L.R. 3-1 to 3-7.
160
Patent L.R. 4-1 to 4-6.
161
Patent L.R. 1-2.
162
Patent L.R. 4-1. This step takes place “[n]ot later than [ten] days after service
of the ‘Preliminary Invalidity Contentions’ pursuant to Patent L.R. 3-3.” Patent L.R.
4-1(a).
163
Patent L.R. 4-2. This takes place within twenty days of the events from L.R. 4-1.
Patent L.R. 4-2(a). The parties must exchange “a preliminary identification of
extrinsic evidence, including . . . dictionary definitions, citations to learned treatise
and prior art, and testimony of percipient and expert witnesses.” Patent L.R. 4-2(b).
164
Patent L.R. 4-3. This takes place within sixty days of step 2. The statement
includes the “construction of those claim terms, phrases, or clauses on which the
parties agree.” Patent L.R. 4-3(a). The statement also includes each party’s
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necessary for claim construction is performed within thirty days of
serving and filing the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing
165
166
Statement. Next, claim construction briefs are submitted. Finally,
the Markman Hearing begins within two weeks of the submission of
167
Unfortunately, that is where the Patent Local
any reply briefs.
Rules end.
Some commentators contend that the Northern District of
168
California’s patent rules improve the litigation process. At the very
least, the Patent Local Rules provide the trial court with some
procedure to follow. While the Northern District’s patent rules may
be beneficial from a procedural standpoint, the true test is whether
the CAFC reverses or affirms claim construction decisions made by
the trial court. Part III.C. will analyze the CAFC’s reversal rate for
2001, including the cases from the Northern District of California
presumably following the Patent Local Rules.
2. Substantive Resources
There is surely no shortage of patent-related literature available
to assist a trial court judge. One patent text specifically for trial
judges is Patent Law: A Primer for Federal District Court Judges
169
(“Primer”).
The Primer spends only two pages discussing the
170
implications of Markman I and II, and another page and a half
discussing appeals to the CAFC, contrasting certification of claim
171
construction with entry of final judgment after claim construction.
Unfortunately, the Primer gives no guidance for actually conducting
172
Markman Hearings.
construction of claims upon which they do not agree. Patent L.R. 4-3(b).
165
Patent L.R. 4-4.
166
An opening brief shall be submitted within forty-five days of the Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement. Patent L.R. 4-5(a). Responsive briefs are
due within fourteen days of service of the opening brief. Patent L.R. 4-5(b). Any
brief in reply to the responsive briefs are due within seven days. Patent L.R. 4-5(c).
167
Patent L.R. 4-6 (“Subject to the convenience of the Court’s calendar, two weeks
following submission of the reply brief . . . the Court shall conduct a Claim
Construction Hearing, to the extent the parties or the Court believe a hearing is
necessary.”).
168
Lee & Krug, supra note 142, at 79. (referring to the Northern District of
California’s 1997 rules, which have been superceded by the 2001 Patent Local Rules)
(“Because, under these rules, the parties must adhere to a variety of mandatory
initial disclosures, the discovery process is more productive.”).
169
JAMES M. AMEND, PATENT LAW: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
(1998).
170
Id. at 15-16.
171
Id. at 17-18.
172
“It is beyond the scope of this Primer to discuss how the Markman [H]earing
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The Federal Judicial Center provides three publications
touching on relevant areas of patent law: the Manual for Complex
Litigation (“Manual”), Patent Law and Practice, and the Reference
173
Manual on Scientific Evidence. Notably, the Manual cautions against
174
the use of a special master for pretrial management. Although the
1995 edition of the Manual does not discuss Markman Hearings, the
section on patents takes care to point out that “primary attention
must be directed to the management of the technical aspects of
175
patent cases.” In particular, the Manual provides that to “ensure a
fair trial, whether it is by the court or a jury, comprehension of the
176
issues and the evidence is critical.”
Comprehension of the issues starts with some education in the
underlying technology of the patent at issue. As former Judge
McKelvie of the District of Delaware recently stated, education “starts
with the trial judge, who even in cases that will be tried by a jury will
need to understand the technology to handle and resolve matters
such as discovery disputes, claim construction and pretrial
177
motions.”
Interestingly, the judge stated that “most judges do not
take any particular or special steps to educate themselves on the
technology in these cases. They do not, for example, read scientific
texts or literature in the field. They rely on the lawyers to educate
178
them.”
The judge identified multiple ways to educate the trial
judge, including general seminars on science, briefs and exhibits,
tutorials by the litigants, video tapes on the technology, court
179
appointed experts, and even law clerks.

should be conducted.” Id. at 16.
173
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995); PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
(1995); REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994). Hopefully, newer
editions will reflect the changes in patent litigation brought on by Markman I and its
progeny. For more up to date information on claim construction, see HERBERT F.
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 (Bureau of National Affairs 2001).
174
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD § 20.14.
175
Id. § 33.6. The subsection on technology states that the “judge will often need
some general explanation of the substance and terminology of the science . . .
involved . . . before attempting to deal with the issues in the case or develop a plan
for discovery and trial.” Id. § 33.61.
176
Id. § 33.66.
177
Roderick R. McKelvie, Problems of Complex Litigation, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 529, 531
(2000). Judge McKelvie was a United States District Court Judge for the District of
Delaware.
178
Id. at 532.
179
Id. at 531-33. The judge noted that some judges “will hire a law clerk who has a
background or interest in science and intellectual property. . . . These law clerks can
be very helpful, even if the cases are not in the area he or she has studied.” Id. at
532.
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Even if the trial judge understands the technology that is the
subject of the claims, it would also be helpful for the judge to
familiarize himself with resources used by patent practitioners. For
instance, if the judge understands how patent examiners perform
claim construction, it cannot hurt when performing construction
during litigation. The place to start is the Manual of Patent Examining
180
Procedure, colloquially known as the MPEP.
As the forward to the
MPEP notes, “[t]his Manual is published to provide [PTO] patent
examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and representatives of
applicants with a reference work on the practices and procedures
181
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the” PTO.
182
While the MPEP does not have the force of law, it is in accordance
with Title 35 of the United States Code, Title 37 of the Code of
183
Federal Regulations and relevant caselaw.
To put it mildly, the MPEP is a voluminous tome including
184
twenty-five chapters covering over 1300 pages, which does not
include more than 600 pages of appendices and indices. Many of the
185
chapters are unrelated to claim construction issues. Other chapters
186
The one chapter critical to
provide helpful background material.
an understanding of claim construction is chapter 2100, which covers
187
patentability.
Therefore, trial judges should be familiar with this
particular chapter.
For example, section 2106(C) explains generally how patent

180

See generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter MPEP].
181
Forward to MPEP.
182
In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“although
[the MPEP] does not have the force of law, [it] provides guidance and instruction to
examiners”); see also In re Beigel, 7 Fed. App. 959, 965 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We note
that the MPEP is not binding on this court . . . ‘although it does not have the force of
law, [the MPEP] is well known to those registered to practice in the PTO and reflects
the presumptions under which the PTO operates.’”) (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“While the MPEP does not have
the force of law, it is entitled to judicial notice as an official interpretation of statutes
or regulations as long as it is not in conflict therewith”); Forward to MPEP (“The
Manual does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.”).
183
Introduction to MPEP.
184
MPEP §§ 100-2500.
185
See, e.g., MPEP §§ 500 (Receipt and Handling of Mail and Papers), 1100
(Statutory Invention Registration) and 1500 (Design Patents).
186
See, e.g., MPEP §§ 600 (Parts, Form, and Content of Application) and 700
(Examination of Application).
187
MPEP § 2100.
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188

examiners should evaluate the claims.
“Office personnel should
begin claim analysis by identifying and evaluating each claim
limitation. . . . [They] are to correlate each claim limitation to all
portions of the disclosure that describe the claim limitation. This is
to be done in all cases . . . [t]he correlation step will ensure that
189
Office personnel correctly interpret each claim limitation.”
The
190
Suggestive or
language of a claim must be carefully evaluated.
191
optional language is not to be used to limit the scope of a claim.
Section 2111 examines the policy of providing claims their
192
broadest reasonable interpretation.
While seemingly in conflict
with the narrow interpretation performed by a judge, both methods
193
of claim construction further important policies.
The broad
reading by the examiner helps to “fashion claims that are precise,
194
clear, correct, and unambiguous.”
The narrow interpretation by
the judge, as stated above, maintains the validity of the claim if
195
possible.
Although claim terms should be given their plain meaning, the
“applicant may be his or her own lexicographer as long as the
meaning assigned to the term is not repugnant to the term’s well
196
known usage.”
Any non-standard definition should be clearly
197
Additionally, the preamble, or
spelled out in the specification.
opening statement of the claim, is generally non-limiting. In order to
limit the claim, the preamble must be “‘necessary to give life,
198
meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.”
On the other hand, a
transitional phrase linking the preamble to the body of the claim may

188

MPEP § 2106(C) tracks many of the canons of claim construction explained
earlier.
189
MPEP § 2106(C).
190
Id. (“As a general matter, the grammar and intended meaning of terms used in
a claim will dictate whether the language limits the claim scope.”).
191
Id. (A non-exhaustive list of such language includes “(A) statements of
intended use or field of use, (B) ‘adapted to’ or ‘adapted for’ clauses, (C) ‘wherein’
clauses, or (D) ‘whereby’ clauses”).
192
MPEP § 2111.
193
Id. (referring to In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997) for the
proposition “that the PTO is not required, in the course of prosecution, to interpret
claims in applications in the same manner as a court would interpret claims in an
infringement suit”); see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
194
MPEP § 2106; see also Etter, 756 F.2d at 858.
195
See Weiss, supra note 7; see also Etter, 756 F.2d at 859.
196
MPEP § 2111.01 (relying on In re Hill, 161 F.2d 367 (C.C.P.A. 1947)).
197
Id.
198
Id § 2111.02 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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199

limit the claim if it is not open-ended.
Another suitable reference that may aid claim interpretation is a
treatise entitled Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting
200
201
(“Landis”). Landis first discusses claim forms generally, followed
202
203
by in-depth analysis of apparatus,
method,
article of
204
205
206
Afterward,
manufacture, chemical, and biotechnology claims.
the author presents a chapter entitled “Thoughts on Writing a
207
Claim,” including a subsection reviewing some claim drafting
208
basics. The goal in suggesting Landis as a useful reference is not to
turn trial court judges into patent attorneys, but rather to allow
209
judges to become familiar with and understand claim format.
3. Rules of Law—Canons of Claim Construction
In addition to understanding the technology of the patent, the
judge should apply some basic principles akin to statutory
interpretation. These are known as canons of claim construction,
which generally comport with PTO guidelines for patent

199

MPEP § 2111.03. The term ‘comprising’ is open-ended, and is “synonymous
with ‘including,’ ‘containing,’ or ‘characterized by’ . . . and does not exclude
additional, unrecited elements or method steps.” ‘Comprising’ means ‘at least.’ Id.;
see Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25205 *17 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 30, 2001) (stating that “because the claims here contain the language
‘comprising,’ the presence of additional [elements] in the accused device does not
remove that device from the scope of the . . . patent claims”). On the other hand,
the “transitional phrase ‘consisting of’ excludes any element, step or ingredient not
specified in the claim.” MPEP § 2111.03. “‘Consisting essentially of’ is a hybrid of
these two terms, and “limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps,”
plus other materials or steps “‘not materially affect[ing] the basic and novel
characteristic(s)’ of the invention.” MPEP § 2111.03 (quoting In re Herz, 537 F.2d
549, 551-52 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (emphasis in original). Other terms, for example
“‘composed of,’ ‘having,’ or ‘being’ must be interpreted in light of the specification
to determine whether” the claim is open-ended or closed. MPEP § 2111.03.
200
FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (4th ed. Release no. 5,
Nov. 2001). Other patent claim reference materials exist, such as KAYTON, 1 PATENT
PRACTICE (6th ed. 1995), cited by Smith and Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 276 F.3d
1304, 1310 (Fed Cir. 2001)), and KAHRL, supra note 139. However, because LANDIS
particularly focuses on claim drafting, it is a more apt reference than general texts.
201
FABER, supra note 200, §§ 4-13.
202
Id. §§ 14-35.
203
Id. §§ 36-44.
204
Id. §§ 45-48A.
205
Id. §§ 49-59.
206
FABER, supra note 200, §§ 70-81.
207
Id. at X-1 to X-55.
208
Id. at X-44 to X-55 (subsection written by Myron Cohen).
209
See Plager, supra note 16.
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210

examiners.
For instance, one canon states that unambiguous
211
intrinsic evidence controls claim construction. Again, the purpose
of extrinsic evidence is to help give the judge a foundation so that she
212
may properly analyze the intrinsic evidence.
Another important
principle is that a claim term should be given its ordinary meaning
213
unless the specification expressly uses the term in a different way.
The ordinary meaning is actually the meaning that a person skilled in
214
the art at the time of the invention would attribute to the term.
Limitations disclosed in the specification should not be
215
imported into a claim.
Patents often include “preferred
embodiments” in order to comport with the best mode requirement
216
of 35 U.S.C. Section 112, first paragraph.
If the specification
provides broader support than a preferred embodiment, it is
improper to limit a claim to the scope of the preferred
217
embodiment. On the other hand, a claim should not be construed
218
to exclude a preferred embodiment. A preferred embodiment can
therefore be viewed as a floor as to claim scope—claims should
generally be construed at least broadly enough to encompass a
preferred embodiment, but are not necessarily limited to the
preferred embodiment. As the CAFC stated in Vitronics, a claim
construction excluding a preferred embodiment “is rarely, if ever,
219
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”
210

See Weiss, supra note 7, at 151-59. One canon in conflict with PTO guidelines
of the MPEP is for the judge to read a claim narrowly (if possible) in order to
preserve validity. See Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In
contrast, patent examiners must give claims their broadest reasonable construction.
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also MPEP § 2106(C).
211
Weiss, supra note 7, at 151.
212
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
213
Weiss, supra note 7, at 152; see also Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals
Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Renishaw PLC. v. Marposs Societa’ Per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
214
Weiss, supra note 7, at 152.
215
Id. at 154.
216
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1994). “The specification shall . . . set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention.”
217
Weiss, supra note 7, at 155 (citing Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). However, when the specification is limited to a preferred
embodiment, the scope of the claims should not exceed that of the preferred
embodiment. Id. (citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. ITC, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Wang Labs v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1337, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
218
Id. at 155.
219
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the trial court’s construction of the term ‘solder reflow temperature’
because it excluded the only preferred embodiment in the specification).
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220

Patent claims are presumed valid. Therefore, claims should be
221
Given a choice
construed so as to maintain validity if possible.
between two possible constructions, one that would preserve validity
and another that would render the claim invalid, the judge should
choose the one preserving validity absent a compelling reason not
222
to. This may require interpreting the claim narrowly, which is the
223
opposite of what is done by the patent examiner.
224
A
Another helpful canon deals with claim differentiation.
225
patent will often include sets of claims of varying scope.
For
example, a “picture claim” may cover a specific embodiment, or
species, of the invention, while a genus claim may include all
226
embodiments presented in the specification. In that situation, the
language of the picture claim should not limit the scope of the genus
227
claim.
Many of the cases from 2001 involved one or more canons of
228
claim construction. The discussion above provides an initial look at
the canons of claim construction, but an exhaustive analysis of them
is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, since many claim
constructions were reversed because of an error involving a canon,
the CAFC should provide clearer guidance so that trial judges can
avoid such pitfalls in the future.
III. CAFC REVERSAL RATES: TRIAL JUDGES ARE NOT GETTING BETTER
AT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Collecting statistical data concerning patent litigation is not
straightforward. While the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts compiles statistics on cases by subject matter, it does not
229
provide in-depth reporting of the cases.
For example, the reports
do not indicate whether judges actually conduct Markman Hearings.
220

35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (stating that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid”).
Weiss, supra note 7, at 156.
222
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
223
MPEP Section 2106(C) provides that “[o]ffice personnel are to give claims
there broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the supporting disclosure.”
MPEP § 2106(C).
224
Weiss, supra note 7, at 159.
225
Karsten, 242 F.3d at 1385 (noting that “it is customary for patentees to present
claims of varying scope or stated in a variety of ways”).
226
FABER, supra note 200, § 60.
227
Weiss, supra note 7, at 159.
228
See infra Part III.D; see also infra app. B.
229
See Moore, supra note 56 (providing an exhaustive statistical analysis of 1411
patent cases from 1983-1999). The purpose of the article was to examine whether it
mattered if the fact-finder was either the judge or the jury. Id.
221
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Also, the reports do not show how often trial judges are reversed on
claim construction decisions. This section attempts to answer these
questions. In doing so, the hope is to illuminate at least a part of the
patent litigation process, with an eye towards improving the
effectiveness of trial judge claim construction.
As an initial matter, it is relevant to put patent litigation in
perspective with regard to other kinds of litigation. For instance, it
has been reported that from 1994 through 1998, approximately
243,000 civil cases were filed annually in the federal district courts,
230
including a yearly average of about 1,700 patent cases.
This
averages out to patent litigation representing about 0.7% of all civil
litigation filed during those years. One study found that over a
recent five-year period, trial judges averaged less than one patent case
231
per year.
During the same time span, the CAFC heard
232
approximately 800 patent cases on appeal.
Even the average number of patent cases per judge is
misleading. From 1989 through 1996, only seven district courts
233
heard at least ten patent cases. The District Court for the Southern
District of New York led the list with twenty-three patent cases over
234
the seven-year span. Even the Northern District of California only
235
had ten patent cases. Thus, trial judges are simply not afforded an
236
opportunity to hear a significant number of patent cases. This lack
of exposure, combined with complex technology and confusing claim
237
language, is a recipe for improper claim construction.
230

McKelvie, supra note 177, at 530 (citing statistics for criminal cases, civil cases,
and patent-related cases filed in the U. S. district courts).
231
See Plager, supra note 16, at 77 (Judge Plager and a law clerk examined 1250
published district court cases over a five-year period, finding that “each trial judge
heard three plus cases over the five year period”).
232
Id. (“[E]ach [CAFC] judge hears about a fourth of the court’s caseload”); see
also Judge Richard Linn, Judge Richard Linn Speaks at 2001 Annual Meeting (Oct.
19, 2001), in AIPLA BULLETIN – 2001 ANNUAL MEETING ISSUE, December 2001, at 7:
In the last fiscal year, the [CAFC] decided 900 cases . . . of which about
1/3 were patent cases. Of the patent cases appealed from the district
courts (308 cases), 12 percent were reversed; 18 percent were affirmed
in part or reversed in part. Of the cases on appeal from the PTO (58
cases), 12 percent were reversed; 3 percent were affirmed in part or
reversed in part.
Id.
233
Allison & Lemley, supra note 6, at 247.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Out of the ninety-four cases heard on appeal in 2001, only four trial court
judges had been part of more than one decision (J. Dimitrouleas, S.D. Fl. (two); J.
McKelvie, D. Del. (three); J. Van Sickle, D. Az. (two); J. Wright, W.D. Mo. (two)).
237
Two out of the four judges involved in more than one claim construction had
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According to the CAFC’s own statistics, the reversal rates for
patent cases appealed from the district courts and the PTO over a
recent four-year period breaks down as shown in table 1.
TABLE 1: CAFC REVERSAL RATES FOR SELECTED COURTS,
10/1/96 TO 9/30/00
YEAR
10/1/96 – 9/30/97
10/1/97 – 9/30/98
10/1/98 – 9/30/99
10/1/99 – 9/30/00

238

District Courts
27%
19%
21%
16%

PTO
0%
23%
17%
17%

One detailed study of patent cases from 1983-1999 by Kimberly
Moore found that, of the 1209 cases resolved by a fact finder, 51%

all of their constructions affirmed (J. Dimitrouleas and J. McKelvie), one judge had
one of the two cases reversed (J. Van Sickle), and one judge had both constructions
reversed (J. Wright). While the sample size is too small to make firm predictions, as
judges perform more claim constructions they will likely have more success (i.e.,
claim constructions affirmed by the CAFC). It should come as no surprise that J.
McKelvie’s decisions were all affirmed on appeal. See William J. Marsden, Jr.,
Delaware District is Top Choice for Patent Disputes, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 2000, at C3
(stating that “Judge McKelvie has spurred many reforms in the way patent cases are
prepared and tried and has championed the Delaware District Court as a patent trial
court”); see also The Honorable Roderick R. McKelvie, Side Bar: Markman v. Westview
and Procedures for Construing Claims, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1065, 1067 (Donald S. Chisum et al. eds., 1998):
Recently, one of our district judges left me a problem that may turn out
to be the solution . . . I scheduled the pretrial conference for two weeks
before trial and a separate hearing on claim construction pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), to be held one week before trial. . . . We avoided
additional delay getting the case to the jury. And after reading the
draft pretrial order submitted by the parties, I felt comfortable that I
could put the claim construction disputes in context.
Id.
238
Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed,
Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30,
1997, at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep97.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table
B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and
Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 1998, at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep98.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table B-8 U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending
During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 1999, at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep99.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002); Table B-8 U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending
During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 2000, at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
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239

(620) of the decisions were appealed.
Of those cases, the CAFC
240
The Moore study focused on
reversed 22% (282) in some form.
judge versus jury fact-finding and did not analyze claim construction
241
decisions.
On the other hand, much scholarly work has been
devoted to the effects of Markman I, particularly with respect to the
242
timing of Markman Hearings.
A. Claim Construction and Markman Hearings: The ABA Surveys
The American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Intellectual
Property, Committee 601, is one group that attempts to track some of
243
the elements of Markman Hearings. Committee 601, dealing with
federal practice and procedure, surveyed its own members in 1997
and 1998 regarding “practices and timing adopted by trial courts to
244
interpret patent claims” in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
In 2000,
Committee 601 surveyed the entire ABA Section of Intellectual
245
Property with similar questions covering 1999.
While the sample sizes of the various surveys were small, they
illustrate the activities of various trial courts. The 1997 survey
246
covered nineteen cases through the end of 1996. The 1998 survey
247
included twenty-six cases from 1997.
The 2000 survey “yielded
seventy-one responses about practices in thirty-three different district
court jurisdictions from ten different federal circuits (all but the First

239

Moore, supra note 56, at 397.
Id.
241
Id. at 368.
242
See generally Austrian & Mohler, supra note 57, at 229-46 (1999) (explaining
various approaches to the Markman Hearing, ground rules for the hearing,
preparing the judge for the hearing, and arguing that Markman Hearings should be
held separately from summary judgment motions); David H. Binney & Toussaint L.
Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman – How Have the Trial Courts Adapted?,
38 IDEA 155 (1997) (reviewing cases where the trial courts have held Markman
Hearings at various stages of litigation, but not evaluating the resulting CAFC
decisions, if any. The article provides a useful table of cases including the evidence
considered by the trial court); John B. Pegram, Markman and Its Implications, 78 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 560 (1996) (an early article presenting various
alternatives that district courts have regarding Markman Hearings); Lee & Krug,
supra note 142, at 70-85 (reviewing the timing of Markman Hearings at various points
in litigation).
243
American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey,
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 12 (2000).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Markman Proceedings Survey Update, IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 1998, vol. 16, no. 3,
28-32 (1998).
247
Id. at 33-37.
240
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Circuit)” concerning cases from 1999.
As the following table
indicates, trial courts predominantly performed claim construction
after the close of discovery.
TABLE 2: ABA SURVEY RESULTS ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION TIMING
Year
249
Pre-1997
250
1997
251
1999

Before or During Discovery
39 %
15%
29.7%

After Discovery
61%
85%
70.3%

The 2000 survey noted that courts often admitted extrinsic
evidence while performing claim construction, and that such
252
evidence was ultimately relied on in 48.9% of the decisions.
253
Notably, 81.5% of the judges held some sort of Markman Hearing.
The 2000 ABA survey noted that six cases were appealed to the
254
255
CAFC. The CAFC reversed five out of the six appealed cases. In
contrast, of the ninety-four cases decided by the CAFC involving
claim construction in 2001, the trial courts held approximately forty256
one Markman Hearings. Seventeen, or 41.5%, of the cases having
248

American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey,
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, at 12.
249
Markman Proceedings Survey Update, IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 1998, vol. 16, no. 3,
at 29 (presented as part of a pie chart).
250
Id.
251
American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey,
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 14 (aggregating separate answers to
question 4 of the survey). In particular, 7.8% of the courts performed claim
construction prior to discovery, 21.9% during discovery, 57.8% after discovery but
before trial, 6.25% during trial, but before closing arguments, and 6.25% during
trial, but after closing arguments. Id.
252
Id. (question 11). The results from question 11 came from subparts to
question 10. Id. Question 10 listed extrinsic evidence types that included technical
and legal expert testimony, inventor and non-inventor factual testimony, and prior
patents or publications. Id. However, the question did not include dictionaries or
treatise. Id.
253
Id. (Question 12).
254
Id. (Questions 24 and 25). Results of both questions were presented with a
caution because of the extremely small sample size. Id. Later in this section, the
article will examine the overall reversal rates of the CAFC. See infra Parts III.B & C.
255
American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law 1999 Markman Survey,
IPL NEWSLETTER, Spring 2000, vol. 18, no. 3, 14.
256
See infra app. A, column “MH Held?” (identifying which trial courts held
Markman Hearings). The analysis identified cases as holding a Markman Hearing
only when the CAFC or lower court decision expressly stated that a Markman
Hearing, claim construction hearing or evidentiary hearing took place (in DoorKing,
Inc. v. Sentex Sys. Inc., 19 Fed. Appx. 872 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the trial judge heard oral
arguments as to claim-related evidence. This was counted as a Markman Hearing).
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Markman Hearings had their claim construction reversed on
257
This rate is no better than the overall claim construction
appeal.
258
reversal rate for all cases in 2001.
Some of the practitioners who responded to the 2000 ABA
survey provided constructive recommendations. For example, in
response to a question about whether the court limited discovery
before holding a Markman Hearing, one practitioner stated that
“[e]arly hearing after some discovery works well, but will not always
be outcome determinative on [sic] cause settlement often, the battle
259
is merely shifted to ‘interpreting’ the court’s ‘interpretation.’”
Another attorney stated that “some substantive guidance and
requirements have to be placed upon judges in order to maximize
260
the usefulness of the Markman procedure.”
More than one practitioner commented on the technical
expertise of the court (or lack thereof). For example, one attorney
261
noted that the use of a special master (in this case a patent
attorney) by the court was very useful. “He sat side-by-side with the
262
Whether the
judge and asked a number of intelligent questions.”
use of the special master helped formulate a correct claim
construction is unknown. On the other hand, a different practitioner
stated that “[f]requently district courts are unable to cope with the
subject matter and fail to understand the claims. Also, they may be
confused between the [role] of the specification, original claims as
filed and as finally allowed. The law clerks typically are ignorant of
263
patent law, science and technology.”
A lack of familiarity of the

It is likely that at least a few trial courts held a Markman Hearing without this fact
being identified in an opinion. At least one court held multiple Markman Hearings,
see for example Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Techn., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed. See infra note 271 for a fuller
discussion of the research methodology.
257
See infra app. A, columns “MH Held?” and “Rev’d CC” (identifying which trial
courts held Markman Hearings and which claim constructions based upon Markman
Hearings were reversed).
258
See infra Table 4 and accompanying text.
259
ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey
Practitioner Response No. 106, Comment to Question 7 (on file with author).
260
ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey
Practitioner Response No. 118, Comment to Question 18 (on file with author). A
main goal of this Comment is to help provide some substantive guidance the
practitioner sought.
261
See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
262
ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey
Practitioner Response No. 130, Comment to Question 6 (on file with author).
263
ABA Section of Intellectual Property, Committee 601, 1999 Markman Survey
Practitioner Response No. 164. (on file with author).
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subject matter may encourage the use of summary judgment
proceedings to expedite the case to the CAFC.
B. Summary Judgment in Claim Construction Cases
The ABA surveys were fairly thorough, but did not ask
practitioners how often judges ruling on cases involving claim
construction granted summary judgment. As the article by Weiss
noted, “[g]iven the apparent reluctance of some courts to schedule
[Markman] [H]earings, parties often resort to filing summary
judgment motions in the hope that the court will hold a Markman
hearing to decide the claim construction issue, even if the overall
264
summary judgment motion is unsuccessful.”
The authors of the
Weiss article found that trial judges decided more patent cases by
265
summary judgment after Markman I than before. In particular, the
authors discovered that in 24% of about 930 cases from Markman I to
June 26, 2000 the trial judge granted by summary judgment, as
compared with 12% of a comparable number of cases pre-Markman
266
I.
The same survey found that summary judgment resulted in a
finding of non-infringement 87% of the time post-Markman I, while
267
only 77% of the time pre-Markman I.
Of the ninety-four cases decided by the CAFC involving claim
construction in 2001, fifty-four cases involved summary judgment
268
decisions by the lower court. The CAFC overturned more than half
269
of the summary judgment decisions on appeal.
Such a high
reversal rate suggests that motions for summary judgment are merely
used as a mechanism to allow an early appeal and have the CAFC
deduce a “correct” claim construction. However, if the trial judge
correctly performed claim construction at the outset, the time delays
and additional costs of the summary judgment appeal process would
264

Weiss, supra note 7, at 149; see also Linn, supra note 232, at 7 (“The [CAFC]
continues to hear a large percentage of cases involving claim construction issues.
Many of the cases come to us on summary judgment following a Markman hearing or
on appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction.”).
265
Weiss, supra note 7, at 148-49.
266
Id. at 149.
267
Id. at 149 n.62.
268
See infra app. A, column “Rev’d SJ” (identifying which cases involving summary
judgment at the trial court were reversed). “Yes” indicates reversal of summary
judgment. “No” indicates affirmance of summary judgment. No marking indicates
there was no summary judgment. See infra note 271 for a fuller discussion of the
research methodology.
269
The CAFC reversed twenty-eight of the fifty-four summary judgment decisions,
or 51.85%, on appeal. Any summary judgment reversed in whole or in part counted
as a reversal of summary judgment.
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be eliminated. Table 3 presents the claim construction cases heard
by the CAFC that also involved summary judgment.
TABLE 3: SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISIONS INVOLVING CLAIM
270
CONSTRUCTION IN 2001
Trial Court
N.D. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D.N.Y.
Top 4 Courts
Other Courts
Total

# of Appealed Cases
Involving
Summary Judgment
8
6
4
3
21
33
54

# of Summary
Judgments
Reversed
2
4
3
1
10
18
28

% of Summary
Judgments
Reversed
25.0%
66.7%
75.0%
33.3%
47.6%
54.5%
51.9%

C. Study of Claim Construction Cases Heard by the CAFC in 2001
This author evaluated all claim construction cases examined by
the CAFC (published and unpublished) during the calendar year
271
2001.
The CAFC ruled on claim constructions by lower courts in
270

Table 3 is excerpted from app. A. The four courts that had the most appeals
(not necessarily the most summary judgments) heard by the CAFC are shown
individually, and the overall total for all courts is shown in the last row.
271
The author researched CAFC decisions from 2001 using the LEXIS and
Westlaw computerized databases. Published and unpublished cases were both
included in the analysis. Any case discussing or mentioning “Markman Hearing” or
“claim construction” was evaluated to determine whether claim construction was at
issue on appeal. Claim construction decisions that were reversed in whole, in part or
implicitly (e.g., the CAFC provided a claim construction different that that of the
trial court) were counted as reversing the lower court’s claim construction. The
collected data include: date, case name, citation, trial court, trial court judge,
whether the trial judge held a Markman Hearing, whether the trial court ruling came
at summary judgment, whether the CAFC reversed summary judgment, whether the
CAFC reversed the claim construction of the trial court, the evidence examined by
both the trial court and the CAFC (e.g., types of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
examined) (not shown in the appendices), and the reason(s) (if any was articulated)
why the CAFC reversed the claim construction and/or summary judgment. Not all
of this data appeared in every decision by the CAFC. When possible, the omitted
data was obtained by analyzing the trial court decision. Appendix A includes the
case name, citation, whether a Markman Hearing was held (“Yes” = held), whether
claim construction was reversed (“Yes” = reversed), and whether summary judgment
was reversed (“Yes” = reversed). Appendix B includes the case name and key points
noted by the author from the CAFC decision. Appendix C includes the case name,
the lower court, and the trial judge (including whether a magistrate was employed).
For data that is missing or unclear, the appendices represent it with either an empty
box or with “??” The author takes full responsibility for any errors in analyzing the
cases.
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272

ninety-four cases.
The next question is how do trial court claim
construction decisions hold up on appeal overall.
One article that did analyze CAFC claim construction decisions
came up with somewhat surprising findings. In contrast to the 40%
reversal quoted by the dissent in Cybor, Thad Adams III and Derel
Monteith, Jr. found that for 1998 and part of 1999 the CAFC reversed
273
only 25% of claim construction decisions. However, the survey only
274
examined thirty-four cases. The survey excluded six cases from the
analysis because the lower court decisions were either pre-Markman I
275
or were not from district courts. In part, this may be attributed to
the fact that post-Markman I appeals from district court cases were
slowly working their way to the CAFC in 1998. The sample size of
only twenty-eight cases may hint that trial courts are getting better at
claim construction, or it may be too small to be statistically reliable.
A more detailed study by Christian A. Chu came up with similar
276
results.
Chu analyzed 179 cases wherein the CAFC provided an
277
express review of claim construction.
Chu found that the CAFC
278
reversed 29.6% of these cases. Another study by Kimberly A. Moore
found that the district courts erred in their claim construction in 28%
279
of the cases prior to 2001.
A detailed study by Gretchen Ann
Bender found that the CAFC reversed approximately 40% of 160 trial
court claim constructions from the time of Markman I through
280
2000. These reversal rates, ranging between 28% and 40%, suggest
that the trial courts have not improved the quality of their claim
constructions.
In the study conducted for purposes of this Comment, the CAFC
reversed thirty-nine of the ninety-four claim construction decisions by

272

See Appendix A for a complete listing of all the cases from 2001 in which the
CAFC ruled on claim construction issues.
273
W. Thad Adams, III & J. Derel Monteith, Jr, The Continuing Saga of Federal
Circuit Patent Claim Construction Jurisprudence: Extrinsic Evidence and Other Stories, 8 FED.
CIR. B.J. 83 (1999).
274
Id. at 100 (Appendix: Summaries of Claim Construction Decisions in 1998-99
Reported Federal Circuit Cases).
275
Id. at 99.
276
Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001).
277
Id. at 1104.
278
Id. (noting that the CAFC modified the claim interpretation for 78 of the 179
cases, and reversed 53 of those 78 cases).
279
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 11 (2001). Moore tabulated 323 cases appealed to the CAFC
between April 23, 1996 and December 31, 2000.
280
Bender, supra note 15, at 205-07.
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lower courts (41.5%) in 2001, either in whole or in part.
This
analysis did not exclude courts besides the federal district courts.
Thus, cases from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(two), the Court of Federal Claims (one), and the International
282
Trade Commission (two) were all evaluated and included.
Such a
high reversal rate clearly suggests that in general the trial courts are
283
not performing any better than at a time just after Markman I.
The following table presents the results for appeals from the
four district courts that had the most claim construction decisions
reviewed by the CAFC, with a minimum of five cases. It also presents
overall results for the combined trial courts.

281

See Appendix A. Notably, this reversal rate matches the percentage of cases
wherein the lower court performed some sort of Markman Hearing but the claim
construction was reversed on appeal; see supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text
(forty-one cases in 2001 held some form of Markman hearing, yet seventeen cases
were found to have faulty claim construction). Such a result—coupled with the
reversal rate for cases from the Northern District of California, see infra Table 4—
clearly shows that the procedural requirements of Markman I have, at best, minimal
affect on the correctness of the trial court claim constructions.
282
Of the five cases from these three courts, the CAFC reversed three of five claim
construction decisions. In Re Roemer, 258 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction reversed); see also Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (claim construction affirmed); Oak Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 248
F.3d 1316, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Winbond Electronics
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction reversed); Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. United States, 265
F.3d 1371, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed).
283
See supra text accompanying note 13. This reversal rate runs contrary to an
impression of Judge Richard Linn of the CAFC, who recently noted that “[t]he
district courts are now quite familiar with the analytical rules of claim construction,
and claim construction decisions are now admirably focused and on point . . . [t]he
increasing familiarity of the district courts with the claim construction process is
being reflected in their decisions, and reversal rates are going down.” Linn, supra note
232, at 9 (emphasis added).
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TABLE 4: CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASES
DECIDED BY THE CAFC IN 2001

Trial Court
N.D. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
S.D.N.Y.
Top 4 Courts
Other Courts
Total

# of Claim
Construction
Cases Heard
by CAFC
11
9
7
5
32
62
94

284

# of Claim
Constructions
Reversed

% Claim
Construction
Reversed

6
3
2
1
12
27
39

54.5%
33.3%
28.6%
20.0%
37.5%
43.5%
41.5%

The Northern District of California, the Central District of
California, the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District
of New York originally heard thirty-two of the ninety-four cases.
While their reversal rate was lower than the overall claim construction
reversal rate of 41.5%, one would hope that the courts getting the
greatest number of patent cases would have more experience,
resulting in better claim construction and distinctly lower reversal
rates. Particularly distressing is that the Northern District of
California, with its Patent Local Rules, had more than half of its claim
285
construction decisions reversed on appeal. The procedural patent
284

Table 4 is a much abbreviated version of the complete table of cases presented
in Appendix A.
285
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(claim construction reversed); see also Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer
Group, Inc., 236 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed);
Amphenol Corp. v. Maxconn Inc., 4 Fed. App. 928, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.,
242 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Telemac
Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom., Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral Inc., 249
F.3d 1314, 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2349 (2002)
(claim construction reversed, but the summary judgment ruling was affirmed);
Budde v. Harely-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction reversed); Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys., 12 Fed. App. 918, 925-26, 928
(Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2323 (2002) (claim construction
reversed, but the summary judgment ruling was affirmed); S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.,
259 F.3d 1364, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing the lower court ruling that the claims
were indefinite—counted as reversing claim construction); MSM Investments Co.,
LLC v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that
although the district court’s claim construction was incomplete, it was at most
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rules merely lead up to Markman Hearings in an efficient manner
but do not direct the district court how to properly perform claim
construction. Therefore, to have any hope of improving reversal
rates, it is critical to examine why the CAFC is reversing the trial
courts’ claim construction.
The CAFC decided six cases in 2001 in which a magistrate judge
286
conducted the claim construction.
Notably, the CAFC reversed
287
only one of the six claim constructions.
While it is too small a
sample size, these results suggest that the use of magistrate judges
might improve claim constructions.
D. Reasons Why the CAFC Reversed Trial Court Claim Constructions
288

One of the leading reasons the CAFC reversed trial court claim
construction decisions in 2001 was the trial court’s improper
importation of limitations from the specification into the claims,
289
which occurred in eight cases.
For instance, unless the patentee
acted as his own lexicographer and defined a claim element in a
specific manner, the person performing claim construction should
construe the element “according to its ordinary and accustomed
meaning, rather than importing a characteristic of a disclosed or
harmless error—counted as reversing the claim construction); Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc, 265 F.3d 1294, 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (claim construction affirmed). Note that these cases were presumably
conducted under the 1997 local rules. However, being procedural in nature, it is
unlikely that the newer 2001 Patent Local Rules will result in reduced reversal rates.
286
Sandt Tech. v. Resco Metal and Plastics, 264 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(claim construction affirmed); see also Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 260 F.3d
1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
Industries, Inc., 21 Fed. App. 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
reversed); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 276 F.3d 1304, 1308-11 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (claim construction affirmed); Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries, Inc., 247
F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Newell Window
Furnishings v. Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 15 Fed. App. 836, 840-41 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed).
287
Circle R, 21 Fed. App. at 898 (claim construction reversed).
288
See infra Appendix B for a listing of key points from the cases, including
reasons why the trial court erred in its claim construction and relevant topics
discussed in the cases.
289
See Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Tech., 263 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Interactive Gift Express Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Circle R, Inc., v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Turbocare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General
Electric Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
260 F.3d 1326, 1331-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 134243 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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290

preferred embodiment.”
One way to avoid this critical error is to
evaluate the specification as a whole, rather than to choose bits and
291
pieces of the specification to support a given claim construction. As
the CAFC noted in Budde v. Harley-Davidson, “it is necessary to
consider the specification as a whole, and to read all portions of the
written description, if possible, in a manner that renders the patent
292
Merely looking at the “summary” and
internally consistent.”
“objects of the invention” sections of the specification can lead to an
293
incorrect claim construction.
However, “clear guidance” from the
294
specification does not lead to improper importation.
A more subtle error occurs when the trial court performs claim
construction from a perspective other than one of ordinary skill in
the art. Because the statutory requirement is for the patent to teach
295
one of ordinary skill to practice the invention, employing a
296
The
different viewpoint may lead to improper construction.
ordinary skill viewpoint can be particularly troublesome because it
represents a hypothetical person who may have a combination of
297
qualities not found in any real person. Because it is often an elusive
290

Generation II Orthotics, 263 F.3d at 1367.
Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1335 (citing Digital Biometrics, Inc. v.
Identix, Inc, 149 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998) for the proposition that claim
construction should be derived from the entire written description although an
isolated passage was in conflict with the rest of the written description).
292
Budde, 250 F.3d at 1379-80.
293
Id. at 1377.
294
Unique Coupons, Inc. v. Northfield Corp., 12 Fed. App. 928, 935 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“Although there is a fine line between interpreting claim language in light of
the specification and reading a limitation . . . into the claim . . . we do not improperly
cross that line when we interpret [a claim term] consistently with the clear guidance
in the specification.”).
295
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (1994).
296
Budde, 250 F.3d at 1380 (stating that “it is important to construe claim
language through the ‘viewing glass’ of a person skilled in the art”); see also MPEP §
2141.03 (“The examiner must ascertain what would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, and not to the inventor,
a judge, a layman, those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.”)
(citing Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co.,
257 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (in reversing the lower court’s claim
construction, Judge Gajarsa posited “the question before us is not whether the ‘255
patent teaches that the boiling point should be measured in the vapor phase; as
discussed above, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the ordinary
meaning of a codistillate boiling point involves measuring the temperature in the
vapor phase”).
297
MPEP § 2141.03. Factors may include the education levels of the inventor and
others in the field, problems in the art, solutions previously employed in the art to
resolve the problems, the innovation level in the art, and the technological
complexity of the art. Id. (citing Environmental Designs, 713 F.2d at 696).
291
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standard, extrinsic evidence related to ordinary skill should be
considered by the trial judge when performing claim construction.
Alternatively, the judge may turn to a special master or court
appointed expert with an appropriate background in the technology
at issue.
Dictionaries are another source of potential confusion and
error. When a claim term is not viewed as a term of art, the CAFC
298
may rely on a non-technical dictionary for a definition.
However,
should the claim term be viewed as a term of art, a non-technical
299
Sometimes the CAFC states that it
dictionary is the wrong choice.
will analyze the intrinsic evidence, while at the same time relying on a
300
general-purpose dictionary.
The study for this Comment found
that the CAFC reversed thirteen out of the twenty cases relying on a
dictionary definition (either by the trial court or the CAFC) on
301
appeal.
298

Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 840 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“‘Adjacent’ is not a term of art and thus should receive its ordinary and
accustomed meaning: close to; next to; adjoining. WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 79 (1988).”).
299
AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“This court has repeatedly cautioned against using non-scientific dictionaries
for defining technical words. . . . This case provides a good example of why
definitions from general usage dictionaries may fail to provide satisfactory
constructions of technical claim terms in dispute. . . . A trial court, when construing
a term of art, must define the term in a manner consistent with the scientific and
technical context in which it is used in the patent.”). Therefore, it is important first
to determine if a claim element is a term of art.
300
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark Products Corp., 18 Fed. App. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“In interpreting an asserted claim, the court first looks to the intrinsic
evidence of record. . . . Turning to the language of claim 3, we first look to the
ordinary meaning of the disputed claim terms. . . . ‘Project’ is defined as ‘causing to
protrude.’”) (internal citation omitted).
301
Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 25 Fed. App. 915, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); see also Rexnord Corp. v. The Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
Industries, Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
reversed); DoorKing Inc. v. Sentex Sys. Inc., 19 Fed. App. 872, 876-77 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (claim construction reversed); Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d
1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Kopykake Enterprises,
Inc. v. The Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
affirmed); Ecolab Inc. v. Envirochem Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(claim construction reversed); Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264
F.3d 1326, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Bell Atlantic
Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v.
Medical Technology Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
reversed after two Markman Hearings); Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark Products
Corp., 18 Fed. App. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); MSM
Investments Co., LLC v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
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Probably one of the trickiest areas relating to patents is the use
302
This language,
of “means plus function” language in the claims.
303
often express as “a means for doing X,” “must be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
304
The MPEP provides an
specification and equivalents thereof.”
excellent reference for detailed analysis of means plus function claim
305
limitations.
As a preliminary matter, the judge must decide if
306
section 112, sixth paragraph applies.
After deciding that means
plus function applies, the judge must “identify the function explicitly
307
recited in the claim.” Next, the judge identifies “the corresponding
structure set forth in the written description that performs the
308
particular function set forth in the claim.”
Then the judge
309
determines equivalents to this structure. It should be evident that

(claim construction reversed); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d
1364, 1369, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Gart v. Logitech,
Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Scholle
Corp. v. Packaging Sys., LLC, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11772, *11-12 (Fed. Cir. June 6,
2001 (claim construction reversed); Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive Med. Techs.
Corp., 10 Fed. App. 928, 930-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed);
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 239 F.3d 1239,
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating
Machinery Sys., Inc. 239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
reversed); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed. App. 832, 84041 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed). In some cases, the trial court did
not rely on a dictionary but the CAFC did. See, e.g., Ecolab Inc. v. Envirochem Inc.,
264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001); AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc.,
239 F.3d 1239, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In other cases, the trial court used a
dictionary while the CAFC relied on intrinsic evidence only. See, e.g., Fin Control Sys.
Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, in some cases
it was not clear what evidence either court examined, so detecting any useful
patterns is not possible.
302
Means plus function claim elements are provided for by 35 U.S.C. Section 112,
paragraph six (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as
a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material or acts in support thereof.”).
303
See MPEP § 2181 (stating that “the claim limitations must use the phrase
‘means for’ or ‘step for’”).
304
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (emphasis added).
305
See MPEP §§ 2181–2186.
306
Use of “means” creates a presumption that Section 112 (sixth paragraph)
applies, but if too much structure provided in the claim element, Section 112 (sixth
paragraph) will not apply. Also, Section 112 (sixth paragraph) can apply even
without use of “means” language.
307
Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
308
Id.
309
An equivalence examination under Section 112 (sixth paragraph) is more
limited than an equivalence examination under the doctrine of equivalents. See
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
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such language can be very powerful. It allows the person drafting the
application to avoid “claim[ing] in a patent every device required to
310
enable the invention to be used.”
311
In 2001, fifteen cases included means plus function claims.
Out of the fifteen cases, the CAFC reversed seven (46.7%) on
312
appeal.
What is surprising is that the CAFC did not reverse a
greater percentage of these cases. The CAFC pointed out a few of
the pitfalls in construing means plus function claim language. The
313
judge must determine the structure of the “means” element. Also,
“a court may not import functional limitations that are not recited in
the claim, or structural limitations from the written description that
314
are unnecessary to perform the claimed function.”
Another
comment was that “[a]s an aid in determining whether sufficient
structure is recited by a term used in a [means plus function] claim
limitation, this court has inquired into whether the ‘term, as the
name for the structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in

1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
310
Asyst Techs., 268 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
640 F.2d 1193, 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
311
Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc., 25 Fed. App. 837, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); J & M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 269 F.3d 1360, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Asyst Techs. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d
1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); McGinley v. Franklin
Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed);
Mollhagen v. Witte, 18 Fed. App. 846, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction
affirmed); Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(claim construction reversed); Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. v. RMR Products, Inc., 10
Fed. App. 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and
remanded, 122 S. Ct. 2349 (2002) (claim construction reversed); Telemac Cellular
Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); Somfy, S.A. v. Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 6 Fed.
App. 895, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction affirmed); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed); Optimal Recreation Solutions LLP v. Leading Edge Techs.,
Inc., 6 Fed. App. 873, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Wenger
Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction reversed); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 4 Fed.
App. 832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim construction reversed); Globetrotter Software,
Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 236 F.3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim
construction affirmed).
312
See supra note 311.
313
Winbond Electronics, 4 Fed. App. at 842 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The Commission
did not determine any structure for the ‘access means’ in its opinion.”).
314
Wenger Mfg., Inc., 239 F.3d at 1233; see also Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1324
(“In this case, the District Court erred by improperly broadening the scope of the
claimed function by ‘reading out’ the limitations contained in the claim language.”).
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315

the art.’”
A combination of solutions can substantially reduce these and
other errors in trial court claim construction. Foremost, as the court
with the best understanding of how to perform claim construction,
the CAFC should provide clear guidance on claim construction
issues. For example, the CAFC should clearly explain how to use
316
dictionaries.
Because reversal rates are so abysmal for cases in
317
which the trial court conducted a Markman Hearing, the CAFC
should attempt to provide some guidelines or standards for these
hearings. Furthermore, the CAFC should identify references that it
318
uses and expressly recommend that trial courts use them as well.
Also, the CAFC should more clearly explain how to properly apply
the canons of claim construction.
Whether or not the CAFC takes any of these steps, trial judges
should also make changes on their own. In most cases, trial judges
do not hear enough patent cases to become proficient in interpreting
claims. Therefore, each district court should designate a judge to
handle patent cases, or at least use an experienced special master or
319
magistrate judge to perform claim construction. However, the onus
should not be placed solely on trial judges and the CAFC. Patent
attorneys and patent agents who draft applications can sidestep many
problems by clearly defining terms, including claim elements, in the
specification. Without the concerted efforts of the CAFC, trial judges
and practitioners, the CAFC will continue to reverse claim
constructions at an unacceptable level, costing litigants millions of
dollars just to get back to the starting gate.

315

Optimal Recreation Solutions, 6 Fed. App. at 877 (quoting Greenberg v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
316
By way of example, in Vitronics, the court stated that extrinsic evidence will
rarely be needed. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1579, 1585; see also
supra note 109. However, the same court stated that dictionaries, a form of extrinsic
evidence, should be consulted at nearly any time. Id. at 1584 n.6; see also supra text
accompanying note 118. Another issue arises in the choice between technical and
non-technical dictionaries. See supra note 298-99 and accompanying text.
317
See supra note 257.
318
See supra Part II.B.2.
319
See Paul D. Rheingold, Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State
Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 910, 912 n.10 (noting that Judge Marina Corodemus
handles all mass tort litigation in the New Jersey state trial courts).
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CONCLUSION
Markman I and its progeny have spawned a whole new era of
patent litigation. Trial judges are required to perform claim
construction as a matter of law. While the trial judges have a lot of
leeway in how they conduct Markman Hearings, the CAFC is still
reversing claim constructions at an alarming rate. Seven years after
Markman I, one can now draw the “empirically sound conclusion”
that the “training and discipline” of trial judges does not result in
reliable claim construction. The reversal rate is still around 40%.
Procedural rules, such as the Patent Local Rules from the Northern
District of California, may provide structure to patent litigation, but
cannot directly improve the quality of claim construction. However,
several actions can reduce the reversal rate. In addition to special
masters, magistrate judges and court appointed experts, trial judges
can rely on widely used references to improve claim construction
skills. Resources that may prove most helpful are tools that have been
long used by patent practitioners. For example, the MPEP is a vital
resource and, when combined with a claim drafting text, should
provide sufficient support for a trial judge so that the CAFC will
uphold more claim constructions. Furthermore, the CAFC must take
a more proactive role in providing clear guidance to the trial judges.
Otherwise, the uncertainty generated by Markman I will continue.

2003

755

COMMENT

APPENDIX A:
TABLE OF APPELLATE LEVEL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASES IN 2001
Case Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

LNP Engineering Plastics,
Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills,
Inc.
Kudacek v. DBC, Inc.
Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson
& Sessions Co.
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc.
Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC,
Inc.
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram
Corp.
J&M Corp. v. HarleyDavidson, Inc.
Superior Fireplace Co. v.
Majestic Products Co.
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson
Smurfit Co.
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v.
Empak, Inc.
Xerox Corp. v. 3COM
Corp.
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
Industries, Inc.
Exxon Research &
Engineering Co. v. U.S.
Hilgraeve Corp. v.
Symantec Corp.
DoorKing, Inc. v. Sentex
Sys., Inc.

Citation

Rev’d Rev’d
CC?
SJ?

275 F.3d 1347

??

No

25 Fed. App. 837

??

No

273 F.3d 1355

Yes

No

276 F.3d 1304

Yes

No

Yes

25 Fed. App. 915

No

No

No

274 F.3d 1336

??

Yes

Yes

269 F.3d 1360

??

No

No

270 F.3d 1358

Yes

No

No

2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25205

??

No

268 F.3d 1364

??

Yes

Yes

267 F.3d 1361

??

No

Yes

21 Fed. App. 894

??

Yes

No

265 F.3d 1371

No

Yes

Yes

265 F.3d 1336

No

No

Yes

Yes: Briefs +
oral
argument

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

19 Fed. App. 872

Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd
265 F.3d 1311
v. OAM, Inc.
Advanced Cardiovascular
17
265 F.3d 1294
Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc.
Kopykake Enterprises,
18
264 F.3d 1377
Inc. v. Lucks Co.
16

MH
held?

??

No

No
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19
20
21

22

23
24
25

26

Ecolab, Inc. v.
Envirochem, Inc.
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v.
Resco Metal and Plastics
Corp.
Kustom Signals, Inc. v.
Applied Concepts, Inc.
TurboCare Div. of Demag
Delaval Turbomachinery
Copr. v.General Electric
Co.
CIVIX-DDI, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp.
McGinley v. Franklin
Sports, Inc.
Glaxo Group Ltd. V.
Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Bell Atlantic Network
Services, Inc. v. Covad
Communications Group,
Inc.

264 F.3d 1358

No

Yes

Yes

264 F.3d 1344

??

No

Yes

264 F.3d 1326

Yes

No

No

264 F.3d 1111

??

Yes

Yes

18 Fed. App. 892

Yes

No

No

262 F.3d 1339

Yes

No

262 F.3d 1333

??

Yes

262 F.3d 1258

??

No

Yes: Held
two
Markman
Hearings

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes:Hearing

Yes

Yes

259 F.3d 1335

??

Yes,
but
harml
ess
error

No

260 F.3d 1343

??

No

No

18 Fed. App. 852

??

No

No

Yes:
Evidentiary
Hearing

Yes

Yes

Generation II Orthotics
27
263 F.3d 1356
Inc. v. Medical Tech Inc.
KX Indus., L.P. v. Pur
18 Fed. App. 871
Water Purification Prods.
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van
29
18 Fed. App. 865
Mark Prods. Corp.
28

30

MSM Investments Co.,
LLC v. Carolwood Corp.

Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves
Bros., Inc.
Masimo Corp. v.
32
Mallinckrodt, Inc.
31

33

Vol. 33:711

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Pall Corp. v. PTI
Technologies, Inc.

259 F.3d 1383

No

2003

Advanced Cardiovascular
34 Systems, Inc. v. Scimed
261 F.3d 1329
Life Systems, Inc.

35

Yes

Yes

Yes

259 F.3d 1364

??

Yes,
but
not
for
releva
nt
claim
Yes

261 F.3d 1316

Yes

Yes

Yes

18 Fed. App. 846

No

No

258 F.3d 1366

No

No

Yes

Yes

Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft
260 F.3d 1326
Corp.

36 S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.
Viskase Corp. v. American
37
Nat’l Can Co.
38 Mollhagen v. Whitte
Pannu v. Storz
39
Instruments, Inc.
Dow Chemical Co. v.
40 Sumitomo Chem. Co.,
Ltd.
41 In re Roemer
Dayco Products, Inc. v.
42
Total Containment, Inc.
Avery Dennison Corp. v.
43
Flexcon Co., Inc.
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo
44
Electronic America, Inc.
Interactive Gift Express,
45
Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.
Applied Concepts, Inc. v.
46
Olympia Indus., Inc.
Datastrip (IOM) Ltd. V.
47
Symbol Techs., Inc.
Newell Window
Furnishings, Inc. v.
48
Springs Window Fashions
Div., Inc.
49 Rapoport v. Dement
Durel Corp. v. Osram
50
Sylvania Inc.
51 Gart v. Logitech, Inc.
K&K Jump
52
Start/Chargers, Inc. v.
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257 F.3d 1364

??

??

258 F.3d 1303
258 F.3d 1317

Yes

Yes
Yes

15 Fed. App. 882

Yes

Yes

No

No

257 F.3d 1331

Yes

Yes

256 F.3d 1323

No

Yes

15 Fed. App. 793

??

Yes

15 Fed. App. 843

Yes

No

15 Fed. App. 836

No

254 F.3d 1053

No

256 F.3d 1298

Yes

254 F.3d 1334

Yes

13 Fed. App. 982

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
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53
54
55
56
57
58

59

60
61
62
63
64

65
66
67
68

69
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Schumacher Electric
Corp.
Unique Coupons, Inc. v.
Northfield Corp.
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus
Sys., Inc.
Acromed Corp. v.
Sofamor Danek Group
Scholle Corp. v.
Packaging Systems, LLC
Transonic Sys. Inc. v.
Non-Invasive Med. Techs.
Corp.
Budde v. HarelyDavidson, Inc.
Biotech Biologishce
Naturverpackungen
GmbH & Co. KG v.
Biocorp., Inc.
Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co.
v. RMR Products, Inc.
Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC
Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Space Systems/Loral, Inc.
Telemac Cellular Corp. v.
Topp Telecom, Inc.
Somfy, S.A. v. Springs
Window Fashions Div.,
Inc.
Medtronic, Inc. v.
Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc.
Schoell v. Regal Marine
Industries, Inc.
Mentor H/S, Inc. v.
Medical Device Alliance,
Inc.
Optimal Recreation
Solutions LLP v. Leading
Edge Techs., Inc.

12 Fed. App. 928
12 Fed. App. 918

Yes
Yes

253 F.3d 1371

Yes
No

2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11772

Yes

Yes

10 Fed. App. 928

Yes

Yes

250 F.3d 1369

Yes

Yes

249 F.3d 1341

No

10 Fed. App. 882

Yes

248 F.3d 1316

No

249 F.3d 1314

No

Yes

247 F.3d 1316

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No
Yes

6 Fed. App. 895

Yes

No

248 F.3d 1303

Yes

No

246 F.3d 1368

Yes

No

Yes

247 F.3d 1202

No

No

244 F.3d 1365

No

6 Fed. App. 873

Yes

2003
Medical Device
70 Technologies. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc.
Pandrol USA, LP v.
71 Airboss Railway Products,
Inc.
Research Corp. Techs. v.
72
Gensia Labs., Inc.
Karsten Mfg. Corp. v.
73
Cleveland Golf Co.
Netword, LLC v. Centraal
74
Corp.
SciMed Life Sys. v.
75 Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys.
Polymer Indus. Prods. Co.
76 v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.
Mycogen Plant Science v.
77
Monsanto Co.
Senior Techs., Inc. v. R.F.
78
Techs., Inc.
Herman v. William
79
Brooks Shoe Co.
80 Maltezos v. AT&T Corp.
Crystal Semiconductor
Corp. v. Tritech
81
Microelectronics Int’l.,
Inc.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
82
Tyco Int’l, Inc.
Amazon.com, Inc. v.
83 Barnesandnoble.com,
Inc.
Forest Labs., Inc. v.
84
Abbott Labs.
Biovail Corp. Int’l v.
85
Andrx Pharms., Inc.
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v.
86
Worth, Inc.
Amphenol Corp. v.
87
Maxconn Inc.
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7 Fed. App. 945

Yes

No

Yes

10 Fed. App. 837

Yes

Yes

Yes

10 Fed. App. 856

Yes

No

242 F.3d 1376

No

Yes

242 F.3d 1347

No

No

No

No

242 F.3d 1337

Yes

10 Fed. App. 812
243 F.3d 1316

No
Yes

2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4179
7 Fed. App. 941

Yes
Yes

6 Fed. App. 850
246 F.3d 1336

No

Yes

4 Fed. App. 946

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

239 F.3d 1343

Yes:
Evidentiary
Hearing

No

239 F.3d 1305

Yes

Yes

239 F.3d 1297

No

239 F.3d 1314

Yes

No

4 Fed. App. 928

Yes

No
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88
89
90
91
92
93

94
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Collett v. Piper’s Saw
Shop, Inc.
AFG Indus., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., Inc.
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v.
Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.
Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Boehringer Ingelheim
GMBH
Winbond Electronics
Corp. v. ITC
Globetrotter Software,
Inc. v. Elan Computer
Group, Inc.
Union Pacific Resources
Co. v. Chesapeake Energy
Corp.

4 Fed. App. 904

Yes

No

239 F.3d 1239

Yes

Yes

Yes

239 F.3d 1225

Yes

Yes

237 F.3d 1359

No

4 Fed. App. 832

Yes

236 F.3d 1361

Yes

No

236 F.3d 684

Yes

No
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APPENDIX B:
KEY POINTS TO NOTE FROM THE CAFC OPINIONS
Case Name

Key Points to Note from the CAFC
Decision

LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v.
Miller Waste Mills, Inc.
2 Kudacek v. DBC, Inc.
Discussion of claim differentiation
Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson &
3
Sessions Co.
Excluding a reasonable practice of a
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon, method is rarely correct; discussion of
4
Inc.
the transitional term “comprising”;
The CAFC referred to the Kayton text.
5 Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.
A discussion of the cannons of claim
construction
and
the
ordinary
6 Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.
meaning of terms; The CAFC used the
MPEP.
A discussion of means plus function
J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson,
7
claims with regard to structure and
Inc.
the Doctrine of Equivalents
Superior Fireplace Co. v.
8
Noting that a patent is presumed valid
Majestic Products Co.
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Explains the term “comprising” to
9
Co.
mean “at least.”
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v.
10
Deals with means plus function
Empak, Inc.
The trial court improperly applied its
11 Xerox Corp. v. 3COM Corp.
own claim construction.
The trial judge (not the magistrate)
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
12
should have used the ordinary
Industries, Inc.
meaning of the term.
The trial court improperly imported a
Exxon Research & Engineering
13
condition from the specification into a
Co. v. U.S.
claim.
Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec
14
Corp.
DoorKing, Inc. v. Sentex Sys.,
15
Inc.
Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd v. OAM,
16
Inc.
1
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17

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v.
Medtronic, Inc.

18

Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lucks Co.
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Dictionary definitions “may always be
relied on by the court.” 264 F.3d 1377,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

19 Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.
20
21
22
23
24
25

26

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

“All claims are presumed valid
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco
independently . . . .” 264 F.3d 1344,
Metal and Plastics Corp.
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied
Concepts, Inc.
TurboCare Div. of Demag
Trial court misread a preferred
Delaval Turbomachinery Copr.
embodiment into a claim.
v.General Electric Co.
CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp.
Discussion of a means & function
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.
interpretation
An error in the trial court claim
Glaxo Group Ltd. V. Ranbaxy
construction was an abuse of discretion
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
in granting a preliminary injunction.
Bell Atlantic Network Services,
Inc. v. Covad Communications
Group, Inc.
Trial court improperly imported a
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v.
limitation into a claim; several claims
Medical Technology Inc.
were improperly construed together.
KX Indus., L.P. v. Pur Water
Purification Prods.
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van Mark
Prods. Corp.
MSM Investments Co., LLC v.
Carolwood Corp.
Day Int’l, Inc. v. Reeves Bros.,
Inc.
Masimo Corp. v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc.
Pall Corp. v. PTI Technologies, Trial court’s error was in reading the
Inc.
plain language of the claims.
Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, Inc. v. Scimed Life
Systems, Inc.
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Trial court improperly imported
35 Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. limitations from the specification into
claims.
The trial court ignored testimony
36 S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.
showing information commonly known
in the field.
Viskase Corp. v. American Nat’l
37
Can Co.
38 Mollhagen v. Whitte
39 Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc.
Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo The trial court performed two claim
40
Chem. Co., Ltd.
constructions, but was still reversed.
41 In re Roemer
Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total
The trial court improperly imported
42
Containment, Inc.
limits into claims.
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Flexcon
43
Co., Inc.
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electronic The preamble is not necessarily
44
America, Inc.
limiting
Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v.
45
Compuserve, Inc.
The trial court failed to properly find
Applied Concepts, Inc. v.
46
structure in the specification for a
Olympia Indus., Inc.
means plus function claim
Datastrip (IOM) Ltd. V. Symbol
47
Techs., Inc.
Newell Window Furnishings, Inc.
48 v. Springs Window Fashions Div.,
Inc.
49 Rapoport v. Dement
The trial court failed to give meaning
Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania
50
to an established term and the
Inc.
specification’s use of the term.
The trial court improperly imported a
51 Gart v. Logitech, Inc.
limitation from the specification into a
claim.
K&K Jump Start/Chargers, Inc.
52
v. Schumacher Electric Corp.
Clear guidance in the specification is
Unique Coupons, Inc. v.
53
not improper importation of a claim
Northfield Corp.
limit.
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Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys.,
Inc.
Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor
55
Danek Group
Scholle Corp. v. Packaging
56
Systems, LLC
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54

57

Transonic Sys. Inc. v. NonInvasive Med. Techs. Corp.

58 Budde v. Harely-Davidson, Inc.
Biotech Biologishce
59 Naturverpackungen GmbH &
Co. KG v. Biocorp., Inc.
Bernard Dalsin Mfg. Co. v. RMR
60
Products, Inc.
61 Oak Tech., Inc. v. ITC
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space
62
Systems/Loral, Inc.
Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp
63
Telecom, Inc.
Somfy, S.A. v. Springs Window
64
Fashions Div., Inc.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced
65
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben
66
Venue Labs., Inc.
Schoell v. Regal Marine
67
Industries, Inc.
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical
68
Device Alliance, Inc.
Optimal Recreation Solutions
69
LLP v. Leading Edge Techs., Inc.
Medical Device Technologies. v.
70
C.R. Bard, Inc.

The trial court misconstrued the type
of seal used.
The trial court improperly used
intrinsic evidence to narrow the scope
of the claims.
The CAFC provided a discussion of the
level of the skill in the art.

The trial court improperly broadened
the scope of the claims.

Discussion of the preamble

A discussion of means plus function
and structure.
A discussion of means plus function
claims.
The trial court claim construction was
in direct conflict with the plain
Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss
71
language of another claim; the trial
Railway Products, Inc.
court claim construction would reject a
preferred embodiment.
72 Research Corp. Techs. v. Gensia Improper use of extrinsic evidence by
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Labs., Inc.
73

Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland
Golf Co.

765

trial court
Discussion of a canon of claim
construction: construe claim elements
so as to preserve validity.

74 Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys.
Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
Mycogen Plant Science v.
Monsanto Co.
Senior Techs., Inc. v. R.F. Techs.,
Inc.
Herman v. William Brooks Shoe
Co.
Maltezos v. AT&T Corp.
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v.
Tritech Microelectronics Int’l.,
Inc.
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Tyco
Int’l, Inc.
Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.

The trial court properly read claims in
view of the specification without
reading in a limitation.

The trial court was not clear in its
claim construction analysis.

Discussion of ‘a’, ‘an’, ‘comprising’,
and ‘having’

Extrinsic evidence is no good when
84 Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs. used to vary or contradict the language
of the claim.
Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx
85
Pharms., Inc.
DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Should look at all intrinsic evidence to
86
Inc.
do claim construction.
Amphenol Corp. v. Maxconn
87
Inc.
88 Collett v. Piper’s Saw Shop, Inc. A discussion of the all elements rule
A discussion of transitional phrases:
AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG closed/open, ‘composed of’; the CAFC
89
cautioned against the use of nonCo., Inc.
technical dictionaries
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating
The trial court improperly restricted a
90
Mach. Sys., Inc.
means element.
Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
91
Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH
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Winbond Electronics Corp. v.
ITC

Globetrotter Software, Inc. v.
Elan Computer Group, Inc.
Union Pacific Resources Co. v.
94
Chesapeake Energy Corp.
93
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The CAFC cited Landis; the trial court
failed to determine the structure for a
means plus function claim
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APPENDIX C:
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISTRICT COURTS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Case Name
LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v.
Miller Waste Mills, Inc.
Kudacek v. DBC, Inc.
Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson &
Sessions Co.
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Ethicon,
Inc.
Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.
J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson,
Inc.
Superior Fireplace Co. v.
Majestic Products Co.
Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit
Co.
Asyst Technologies, Inc. v.
Empak, Inc.
Xerox Corp. v. 3COM Corp.
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
Industries, Inc.
Exxon Research & Engineering
Co. v. U.S.
Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec
Corp.
DoorKing, Inc. v. Sentex Sys.,
Inc.
Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd v. OAM,
Inc.
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v.
Medtronic, Inc.
Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lucks Co.
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.
Sandt Technology, Ltd. v. Resco
Metal and Plastics Corp.
Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied
Concepts, Inc.

Lower Ct

Trial Ct. Judge

D. Del.

McKelvie

N.D. Iowa

Bennett

N.D. Ill.

Reinhard

D. Md.
W.D. Wisc.

Magistrate Claim
Construction
Chasanow
Crabb

D. Az.

Broomfield

C.D. Cal.

Baird

D. Ore.
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